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Abstract 
 
Gassco is the operator of two platforms with gas transport functions. These platforms are getting old 
and require large modifications to extend the lifetime and maintain their functions. Rapid 
development in subsea technology the recent years enables functions that earlier where performed 
by offshore platforms to be converted into subsea systems. Subsea developments offer the potential 
of reduced CAPEX, OPEX and risk reduction in terms of HSE. This makes subsea developments an 
attractive alternative to conventional topside developments. As a case study, this thesis evaluates 
the challenges and opportunities related to moving the functions of Heimdal Riser Platform into a 
subsea system. The requirements of a mid/downstream operator such as Gassco have not been 
widely evaluated by the subsea industry. A subsea gas transition hub is fundamentally different from 
other subsea developments due to the fact that there is no production involved. Subsea production 
systems have an increasing demand for power due to their complexity. A subsea gas transition hub is 
simpler and the power demand is low compared. With no nearby topside host facilities, there are 
challenges with respect to the subsea power supply and communication. Traditionally these 
requirements are provided by an umbilical which are tied-back to a host platform. Considering the 
low power demand and the long offsets to nearby host facilities, a long and costly umbilical may be 
hard to justify. Hence has the focus of this thesis been to eliminate the requirement of an umbilical. 
Many R&D projects, with the objective of reducing costs and risks related to umbilicals, have 
commenced the later years. Although many of the projects have been successful, the umbilical 
maintains as the only option to meet subsea production systems requirements. In this thesis, based 
on earlier studies, alternative solutions for power supply and communication have been evaluated. 
All the equipment that are required to maintain the gas transport functions will be incorporated 
within a 230 tons subsea manifold(excluding protection structure). This includes a remotely operated 
subsea flow control valve, a subsea High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) and a subsea 
pig launcher guiding base. The structure also incorporate isolation valves which facilitate the 
opportunity to retrieve the HIPPS and flow control modules if maintenance is required. The subsea 
control system is based on the All-Electric technology which eliminates the requirement of hydraulics 
for valve actuation. The control system is powered by a rechargeable Lithium-Ion battery package 
which requires periodic recharging of energy from an intervention vessel. Communication between 
the subsea system and the master control station is provided by a connection to the integrated 
subsea fibre network in the North Sea. This subsea concept implements technologies that have not 
been widely used by the industry, hence a qualification program must be initiated before a fully 
functional subsea gas transition hub is ready for installation.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Gassco was founded by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 2001 to meet EU requirements to 
organisation and transportation of gas to the European market [1].  New regulations required an 
independent, neutral part to be the operator for the infrastructure that earlier were operated by 
several companies. Gassled, which is a joint venture stakeholder organisation, is the owner of the 
infrastructure. Gassco’s responsibilities comprise the operation of pipelines and facilities, 
infrastructure development and to ensure that gas is transported to the market in correct volumes 
with right quality. The infrastructure includes 7975km pipelines, two processing plants (Kårstø and 
Kollsnes) and two riser platforms. In addition, gas receiving terminals located in Germany, Belgium, 
France and UK are parts of the network. See Figure 1 for an overview. 
 
Figure 1: Gassco operated infrastructure (Gassco homepage, 2014) 
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The Heimdal Riser Platform (HRP), located in the North Sea is a gas transit hub (Jacket structure) for 
producing fields located in the region, see Figure 2. Gas from Oseberg, Huldra, Heimdal and Vale is 
allocated at HRP and distributed as specified to receiving terminals at the continent (through 
Statpipe) and St. Fergus in UK (through Vesterled). HRP is tied back to Heimdal Main Platform (HMP)  
which is operated  by Statoil. Statoil also serves as technical service provider (TSP) of HRP on behalf 
of Gassco. HMP is a processing centre for fields located in the region. Its current status is that its 
licensees are searching for new resources in the region  that can extend its lifetime [2]. HMP may 
however discontinue gas processing in near future which would affect the operation of HRP. Studies 
evaluating HRP’s future as a gas transit hub need to be conducted.  
 
Figure 2: HRP and HMP with main pipelines [3] (in the event HMP processing is shut down) 
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1.2 Problem Description 
 
Gassco is the operator of two platforms with gas transit hub functions (Heimdal Riser and Draupner). 
These platforms are getting old and require large modifications to extend the lifetime and maintain 
their functions. As a consequence, the operating costs will increase significantly and other 
alternatives to maintain the gas transport have to be evaluated. One alternative is to convert the gas 
transit hub functions performed by topside systems today into subsea systems.   
Some platforms in the transport network, like the compressor platforms 2/4-S, MCP-01, H-7 and B-11 
have over the last years been bypassed and are/will be removed. However, these platforms were 
replaced by simple bypass spools without valves and other functions to control the gas transport.  
The function of a gas transition hub is to route and mix gas from different facilities. To control these 
functions, both on/off valves and choke/control valves are operated. Topside operation of such 
systems is today considered well known practice, but what about if they were located subsea? 
Rapid development in subsea technology  the recent years enables more and more complex 
functions to be performed at the sea bed. In this master thesis relevant subsea technology will be 
investigated and its application in a subsea gas transition hub system will be looked further into.  
The Heimdal facilities and functions will be used as a base case. The case assumes that HMP 
processing is shut down, and that the gas transit hub functions performed by HRP today shall be 
converted into a subsea system. 
 Main challenges and areas of interest will be: 
- Requirements of a  subsea gas transit hub system 
- Manifold Systems 
- Subsea Control Systems 
- Power and Communication 
- Flow control systems 
- High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) 
- System layout 
The opportunities and challenges related to a subsea gas transition hub will be evaluated. As a 
product of this thesis, a recommendation for a subsea concept will be given. 
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1.3 Design Basis 
 
In the event HMP processing is shut down,  it is assumed that the fields Heimdal, Huldra and Vale will 
no longer transport gas through HRP. Grane is currently importing gas from Heimdal for injection and 
will in the future re-produce this gas. This gas will most likely be rich and require processing before 
entering the dry gas transportation system. As of today, the Grane facility does not have sufficient 
processing capacities and thereby has to find other transportation solutions than the Heimdal Subsea 
System. Hence, the system comprises pipelines connecting Oseberg Gas Transport (OGT), Vesterled,  
and Statpipe (Heimdal-Draupner) (Figure 3).The Statpipe pipeline is required  to have bidirectional 
flow. The Vesterled pipeline has lower design pressure than Oseberg and thereby requires a pressure 
protection system in order to fully utilize the capacity of the system. 
 
Figure 3: Battery limits 
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2. State of the art -  Subsea Technology 
 
Subsea technology in the oil and gas business is a large subject. Traditionally when talking about 
subsea systems one refers to subsea production systems. These systems comprise (to some degree) 
down-hole completions, X-mas trees (wet wells), control and power systems, manifolds, flow lines 
and risers. In this thesis the system under consideration is not a subsea production system but a 
subsea gas distribution system. The system is downstream of processing; hence there is no 
production or processing requirements.  To fulfil the system’s requirements, piping and valves must 
be arranged in a manifold. This manifold needs to be remotely operated and high availability of its 
functions is required.  
The following sections will give a historical view of the development of subsea technology. Thereafter 
a state of the art introduction to subsea technology relevant for a subsea gas transit hub system will 
be given.  
 
2.1 History  
 
The first registered commercial activity on the sea bed was in ancient Greece where divers collected 
sponges, which at the time was discovered to be useful when taking a bath [4]. More advanced 
diving techniques were developed in the 17th century.  Ballasted diving bells could be used for 
salvage work, e.g. of sunken ship wrecks. In 1658, as ordered by the king of Sweden, a successful 
subsea operation managed to retrieve most of the canons from the famous sunken Vasa ship using a 
diving bell [5]. Like many other technological advances, subsea technology evolved as a result of 
warfare. During World War I submarines were used in all navies for intelligence missions and to bring 
destruction to enemies. As the world’s demand for energy increased after World War II, oil and gas 
exploration were moving offshore. In 1947 the first offshore wells were drilled in 100m water depth 
from a fixed Jacket structure in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) [6]. After this, the offshore petroleum 
activity accelerated all over the world.  
Hansen and Rickey [7] have given a good overview of the developments the following years. As the 
technology evolved and the search for energy continued, the petroleum activity moved into regions 
where conventional offshore platform concepts were limited by water depth. In 1961 the world’s 
first subsea completion was installed in 16m water depth at the West Cameron field in GoM. This 
system was designed for remote installation and operation as an experiment for future deep water 
subsea developments.  In the early 1960’s the first full scale subsea developments were done. The 
Conception and Molino fields were both developed with subsea satellite wells tied back to a platform 
and to shore. Even though the Molino field was located in shallow water (so divers could access the 
system), a special robot was designed for remote intervention, indicating that operators were 
preparing for future deep water subsea developments. In the 1970’s a pilot test programme was 
initiated in the GoM. A 3-well template was installed demonstrating technology required to install, 
operate and maintain a subsea production system throughout the field life. In 1971, Ekofisk, the first 
oil field to be developed on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) was allowed early production by 
installing four subsea satellite wells tied back to a jack-up platform. Some years later the Argyll field 
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on UK sector was the first field in the world to be developed using a Floating Production System (FPS) 
with subsea wells. 
At this time diver assisted installation and maintenance were well established practices. However, as 
discoveries were made in deeper waters, improving diver- less technology was required. In 1992 the 
Snorre field was developed as a subsea solution in 335m water depth. A 10-slot well template is tied 
back over 6km to a host Tension Leg Platform (TLP). Diver less technology developed from the pilot 
test programme in GoM was used for installation and maintenance of the subsea system. Robot 
systems to support installation and maintenance deployed from surface vessels evolved from fixed 
track systems to what today is known as the  free flying Remote Operated Vehicle (ROV). 
The advancements in subsea technology on the NCS have during the recent decade continued to 
break limits. Statoil’s vision is to have a complete subsea factory within 2020 (Figure 4) [8], which 
means that processes that only have been feasible topside, can be moved to the sea bed. Such 
processes include: multiphase pumping, separation and compression. In addition challenges related 
to power support, instrumentation, logics 
of systems and so on must be dealt with. 
Multiphase pumping enabled the Lufeng 
field,  located south-east of Hong-Kong, to 
be developed in 1997. Due to heavy crude 
oil and deep waters the field would not 
have been commercially possible to 
develop without this new technology [9]. 
The subsea separation milestone 
was reached in 1999 when the Troll 
pilot Separator Station was installed 
on the Troll field [9]. The concept 
included a separator and a produced 
water injection pump. By enabling subsea 
separation, the produced water could be 
extracted from the well-flow, de-
bottlenecking the system, and thereby allowing higher hydrocarbon production. At the same time 
the separated produced water was re injected into the reservoir with a centrifugal pump to maintain 
reservoir pressure.   
More recently, huge steps have been taken towards subsea  gas compression. Gas reservoirs may be 
technical or economical unfeasible to develop due to long distances to host facilities and/or 
insufficient reservoir pressure. This has led to poor recovery rates and that smaller fields have not 
been developed. By installing a gas compressor on the seabed compared to topside, the suction 
pressure can be drawn further down allowing higher production rates and increased total 
production. The subsea solution also has advantages with respect to HSE, OPEX, energy efficiency 
and placement challenges (topside). In particular two projects need to be mentioned when talking 
about subsea gas compression: Ormen Lange Subsea Compression Pilot and Åsgard Subsea 
Compression [10].Ormen Lange is a gas field located 120km off the Norwegian Coast. It is developed 
as a subsea tieback to shore solution. Complex solutions and technologies have been utilized for this 
to be possible. In its later field life, subsea gas compression would be a solution to maintain optimal 
 
 
Figure 4: Statoil’s subsea factory comprising wells, separators, oil 
storage, pumps, control systems and gas compression (Statoil homepage, 
2014) 
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production rates for as long as possible. Ormen Lange Subsea Compression Pilot  project was 
initiated by Norsk Hydro in 2006. In 2011 a 12.5 MW compressor and a 400kW liquid pump delivered 
by Aker Solutions were ready for installation in a test pit at Nyhamna. A final selection for 
compression concept has not yet been chosen. Meanwhile Statoil decided to go for a subsea 
compression solution on the Åsgard field. Due to pressure decrease in the Mikkel and Midgard fields 
which are tied back to Åsgard B, liquid accumulation will cause an unstable flow regime and slugs. 
Subsea compression is a solution for this problem and it will help to produce another 280 million 
barrels of oil equivalents. Studies and experience from the Ormen Lange pilot have made this 
possible and project start-up is scheduled for 2015.  
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2.2 Manifold 
 
A manifold is a system of pipes and valves used to manage and distribute fluids. Subsea manifolds 
are traditionally used in subsea production systems, i.e. in connection with wells. There are mainly 
two solutions of manifold arrangements, the cluster and the  multi-well template solution (Figure 5). 
Which of the solutions is chosen depends on reservoir conditions, drilling schedule, system 
complexity and so on. The focus will not lay on manifold concepts, but on their functions and 
requirements in a gas distribution system. 
 
Figure 5: The cluster and multi-well manifold arrangement [11] 
The manifold can be the host of many critical functions and equipment depending on its application 
in a system. A typical manifold arrangement will include pipe branching and isolation valves 
controlling flow directions. But it may also include other flow control devices such as choke/control 
valves, flow metering instrumentation and HIPPS. Also injection lines, subsea control module (SCM), 
control system functions and connection points for flow line tie-ins may be facilitated by the 
manifold. In other words, a manifold can be the structural foundation of all equipment required to 
perform all system functions.  
The manifold may host complex equipment responsible for critical functions of a system. Downtime 
of its functions could lead to significant economic losses. Hence is high reliability required for a 
manifold to be economical feasible in a project. Paula et al. [12] identified the following critical 
components that affects the reliability of a subsea manifold: 
- Subsea valves – Are used to direct and seal the flow and may be remotely operated or 
manually by divers or ROV’s. The manifold functions are strongly dependent of the valves.  
- Chokes – Valves used to control the flow. They are exposed to erosion and abrasion effects 
and unexpected maintenance may be required 
- Control systems – the valves on the manifold are normally actuated by a control system (e.g. 
MUX E/H, direct hydraulic). Some failures that may occur are: Jumper and umbilical leakage, 
Surface power unit failure and failure of electronic components such as solenoid valves and 
Subsea Electronic Module (SEM) incorporated within the Subsea Control Module (SCM). 
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To obtain high reliability, these components must be designed with high quality and with respect to 
future intervention. Components with high failure probability rate should be modularized so that 
when components fail or require maintenance, they can be retrieved by intervention vessels. Such 
operations are expensive; the design should therefore be optimized with respect to IMR operation 
efficiency. 
Most manifolds are constructed for subsea production systems, but there are examples where 
manifolds have been used to facilitate gas transit hub functions. In Trinidad and Tobago a 48 inch 
pipeline manifold was installed as a part of the BP Bombax Pipeline project [13]. To meet the 
increasing demand for natural gas, a 63km 48 inch pipeline was installed from the Cassia B platform 
to a LNG facility on the east coast of Trinidad. The 48 inch is connected to an existing 40 inch pipeline 
via a 20 inch jumper to increase the capacity of the system and provide flexibility. Also a new 
wellhead platform, Kapok, was installed with a 26 inch multiphase flow line connected to the Cassia 
B platform for processing.  The Kapok platform was, due to the development scheme, ready for 
production before Cassia B processing was available. So to allow early production, the Kapok 
platform carried out separation with test separators and transported liquids through a 6inch to an 
existing 12inch liquid line. The separated gas was then transported through the 26inch pipe and 
connected to the 48inch pipe via an early jumper. See Figure 6 for an overview. 
 
Figure 6: Bombax field Layout [13] 
To facilitate looping of the 40 and 48inch pipelines with actuated valves, early production jumper, 
ESD valves, crossings of pipelines and providing connection point for future tie ins (with double block 
and bleed), a manifold was constructed and installed.   
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Summed up, manifolds facilitate many important functions when included in a system. Each of these 
functions are carried out by different equipment and arrangements. These sub functions and 
equipment are sometimes very complex and should be given closer attention. In the next sections 
the state of the art with respect to this equipment will be investigated.  
 
2.3 Subsea Control Systems 
 
The subsea control system might be the most critical part of the subsea system. Its function is to be 
the interface between the equipment installed on the sea bed and the topside host facility. This 
includes mainly equipment to monitor and operate the subsea system. Subsea control systems 
became a necessity when the development moved towards subsea production systems. The past 
decades the development of different control system concepts and types has been significant. The 
first types were of the direct hydraulic systems where valves were operated by a direct hydraulic 
connection to the host facility. The use of direct hydraulic systems was followed by the piloted and 
sequenced valve hydraulic systems. Drivers such as improved response time, accurate monitoring, 
reliability, harsher environments, costs and increasingly complex systems have later forced the 
development towards electro hydraulic systems and what today is the known as the multiplexed 
electro hydraulic system (MUX EH) [14]. The MUX EH system is today the most used control system 
for subsea developments; however the industry is always looking for better solutions. The following 
sections will evaluate the well-known MUX EH system, but also the unconventional All-Electric 
System and  the Autonomous Control System will be given proper attention.  
2.3.1 Multiplexed Electro Hydraulic Control System 
 
The MUX EH control system is the preferred control system type for most subsea developments 
today. Compared to the earlier all-hydraulic based control systems, the MUX EH relies on optical or 
electrical transmissions of control signals which give this system excellent response time [15]. In 
general, the electro hydraulic control system consists mainly of three parts: Topside equipment, 
umbilical and subsea equipment, see Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: General overview of components in MUX E/H control system 
 
The topside system comprises the Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) which includes pumps, accumulators 
and storage of fluid to provide the necessary hydraulic power for the system, the Subsea Power and 
Communication Unit (SPCU) providing electrical power and distributing signals for communication, 
and the Master Control Station (MCS) for monitoring and operation of the subsea control system. 
The hydraulic circuit can be designed as an open or closed loop system. In open loop systems the 
hydraulic fluid is non-toxic; water based and is vented to the sea.  
The umbilical connects the topside equipment to the subsea system. Electrical lines power the SCM 
and can be used for communication (normally only as back-up). The electrical lines are bundled 
together with hydraulic lines and fibre optics for communication (see more in section 2.5). In some 
applications, service lines like for e.g. chemical injection are included. Umbilicals (Figure 8) are often 
dynamic since they are subjected to currents, waves and vessel motions (depending on its 
application). To improve their dynamic behaviour buoyancy elements may be installed on the 
umbilical.  
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Figure 8: Umbilical cross section [11] 
The subsea configurations and complexity varies from system to system, but the subsea control 
module (SCM) is always present. The SCM is the interface and communication unit between topside 
and subsea equipment. It distributes signals from subsea sensors and manages the hydraulic 
functions of the system. More attention will be given the SCM in section 2.3.4. The fast response of 
the system is achieved by the use of multiplexed electric signals that activates solenoid valves on 
hydraulic lines which in turn energizes actuators, see Figure 9.  Inbuilt accumulators store energy 
when the demands are low and provides high pressure energy when required (e.g. when operating a 
valve) [16]. Energy stored at site will reduce the operating time. Also support equipment like flying 
leads, termination points, hydraulic couplers etc. are important parts of the system [17].  
 
 
Figure 9: Simplified overview of the subsea functions in a MUX E/H control system (edited figure from [14]) 
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2.3.2 All-Electric Control System 
 
All conventional subsea control systems are until now based on hydraulic control technology. The 
MUX EH has proved to be fast responding and to provide good regularity for the systems. However, 
the system is not perfect and the industry is starting to recognize that as O&G activities  move into 
deeper waters and more remote locations, the MUX EH control system will not be adequate [18]. 
Since the system is based on hydraulic energy, certain limitations due to the nature of hydraulic 
fluids and systems occur. In deep waters the hydrostatic pressure can be a major problem. Large 
volumes of accumulated energy may be required to operate valves and accumulators must be 
designed with large wall thicknesses to withstand the external forces. The results of this may be large 
accumulators which impose challenges with respect to installation and manufacturing . If the systems 
also are remotely located, the fluid volumes required to operate the system may be beyond what is 
possible for a topside facility to handle.  
The MUX EH has successfully been applied in projects worldwide with excellent performance. 
However there are weaknesses that limit its application and economic feasibility. A hydraulic system 
consists of components such as pumps, valves, cylinders, hydraulic couplers and so on. These are all 
subjected to wear and tear. Studies have shown that a significant portion of reliability problems in 
production control systems are due to hydraulic components and activities such as installations and 
operation associated with these [18]. Also topside storage capacities introduce challenges, especially 
when the required fluid volumes are large. The driver is always to optimize system availability with 
cost efficient methods. New technology needs to be developed and existing systems need to be 
improved.  
The weak link in today’s conventional subsea control systems is the hydraulics and much effort has 
been given to improve reliability and costs. The recent years a new subsea control system concept 
has evolved significantly, namely the All-Electric control system (AE). This system relies on electric 
actuation of valves, thereby eliminating problems related to hydraulics. The industry’s interest in all-
electric systems is not new. Already in the early 1990’s programs for developing electrical subsea 
actuators were initiated. However, the first all-electric production control system was delivered by 
Cameron in 2008 at the K5F field in the North Sea, Dutch sector. The tieback to the host platform is 
9.6km in 37m water depth [19]. A Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analysis 
conducted in advance of production initiation, calculated a 2% improvement of system availability 
compared to a MUX EH system. This corresponded to a total system availability of 95.5%. An 
examination of the performance of the system in July 2010, considering 16550 hours of operation, 
found that a total system availability of 99.98% had been achieved. The error leading to a 0.02% 
downtime was due to a topside network failure and was not subsea related [20]. The improved 
reliability of all-electric control systems had successfully been demonstrated.  
Based on lessons learned from the pilot project, the work on developing the 2nd generation all-
electric control was initiated [21].  Cameron together with operators, reviewed the pilot project and 
identified constraints for further application of the system. To reduce the costs and complexity a 
simplification of the subsea hardware was necessary. The amount of redundancy applied in the pilot 
system was in some areas considered superfluous. In addition, a state of the art communication 
technology was implemented into the system.  
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A simplified overview of the AE system is given in Figure 10 [22] [21].The topside of the AE consists of 
two electrical power units (EPU) which provides power and communication for the subsea system. 
These units are independent, hence power supply redundancy is provided. The MCS provides the 
human interface functions needed to monitor and operate the subsea system. The umbilical contains 
redundant optical fibre and power cables to establish reliable operation and communication with the 
subsea system. An umbilical termination assembly (not in shown in the figure) facilitates the tie- ins. 
Power and signals are transferred to the EPCDU where incoming fibre optic signals are converted into 
DSL signals which establishes further connection to the Electric Subsea Control Module (ESCM). The 
Power is regulated and distributed further to the ESCM. Each EPCDU is capable of controlling up to 
five ESCM’s. The ESCM has the same functions as the traditional SCM (as for a MUX EH), but without 
the use of hydraulics. The ESCM can control up to 32 electrical actuators and redundancy is provided 
for power conversion and communications units. Without repeaters the step-out distance from host 
facility to EPCDU is 160km, and the maximum distance between EPCDU and ESCM can be 15km.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Simplified overview of the All-Electric control system 
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The 2nd generation AE is going through a comprehensive qualification process (2011) to verify its 
intended functionality in subsea systems [21]. The advantages of AE systems compared to hydraulic 
systems are evident and there is little reason to believe that the AE system will not be an important 
part in the future of subsea technology. Subsea technology is heading towards subsea processing 
which relies on smart, environmental friendly, fast responding and high accuracy control systems. 
The AE system is a step towards those requirements.  
 
 Summed up, the advantages of AE compared to traditional control systems are: 
- Environmental friendly (risk of hydraulic fluid spill is eliminated) 
- No hydraulic fluid 
- Electrical engines give better operational control  
- Real time feedback of operated equipment 
- Reliability of electric components are better 
- Enable efficient control of subsea systems in ultra-deep waters  
- Enable efficient control of subsea systems for ultra-long offsets 
 
2.3.3 Autonomous Control System 
 
An autonomous subsea control system (ASC) serves the same functions as the MUX EH and AE 
systems, but it has one major disparity. The ASC has no hardware connection to the host facility, in 
other words, it is an umbilical-less control system. This eliminates the costs and risks associated with 
the umbilical. The main characteristics of the ASC are that it relies on a local power source and  that 
it communicates with the host facility with wire-less technology. Since the 1980’s several 
comprehensive R&D projects within the field of ASC have commenced. The ASC technology does not 
narrow down into one outstanding concept, rather several concepts have been introduced. This 
section will address what has been done within the field of Autonomous Subsea Control Systems the 
past decades.  
In 1987 the world’s first autonomous subsea production system was installed at the Luna 27 well 
development in the Ionian Sea [23]. The project named Subsea Wells Acoustic Control System 
(SWACS), was a joint venture project between Tecnomare, Kongseberg Vaapenfabrikk and Norsk 
Agip. The communication between subsea system and host facility was made by a hydro-acoustic link 
at a 3700m step-out. Further communication between the host and a main control station were 
established by a radio link, see Figure 11. High reliability of communication was achieved by using 
good transmission protocols and error detection algorithms.  
16 
 
 
Figure 11: Communication concept in  SWACS project 
The SCM was designed to control eight valves, seven XT valves and the SSSV, in addition to 
monitoring five instruments (pressures, temperatures and valve positions). To minimize the power 
consumption, signals were sent to the host every half hour. In the period in-between signal 
transmissions, the SCM is capable of autonomously initiate safety procedures if necessary. Two 
closed-loop hydraulic circuits secure hydraulic pressure for the valve actuators, one for the SSSV and 
one for the XT valves. Power for the electromotor and hydraulic pump, instruments and signal 
transmission was initially provided by a Lithium battery package. The lithium battery package proved 
its feasibility. However, lithium batteries require regular substitution or recharging, which means 
additional costs of expensive intervention vessels. In 1996 a Sea Water Battery (SWB) was installed, 
replacing the lithium battery package [24]. These batteries generate power locally based on metal 
anodes which use sea water as an electrolyte with an inert cathode of titanium,  see more in section 
2.4. The performance of the SWB was as expected and concluded to be successful.   
 
Other projects such as the Subsea Powered Autonomous Remote Control System (SPARCS) [25] and 
the Autonomous Power and Control System (APAC) [26] set focus on developing efficient local power 
supply. The SPARCS concept used turbine generators (if water injection well) or thermo electric 
generators (if production flow line) to generate power. The turbo electric generator is installed in the 
flow line and converts kinetic energy of injection water into electrical energy. A thermo electric 
generator uses the differential temperature between the production fluid and the surrounding water 
to generate electric power. See Figure 12 for concept overview. 
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Figure 12: SPARCS concept [25] 
For the APAC project, a thermo-electric power source was chosen. The requirements for the 
generator were to deliver 200W in 2000m water depth. A prototype testing proved that the thermo-
electric technology was feasible as power source in an autonomous production system. The 
generators charge batteries when the power consumption is low, so sufficient power is available for 
peak demands.  
All these concepts rely on hydro-acoustic communication with the host facility. I the North Sea a 
range of 10km in 100-150m water depths is considered to be practical [26]. So hydro-acoustic 
communication has limitations with respect to data capacity and step-out range (see more in section 
2.5). These disadvantages are significant opposed to the other control systems discussed in the 
previous sections.  
One concept dealing with the limitations of underwater wireless communication is the hybrid system 
[27]. The concept is characterized as a hybrid system since it has no umbilical connection to the host, 
but still has an umbilical connection to a surface moored control buoy. Different configurations of 
this concept can be implemented. The surface buoy may incorporate power supply, batteries, and 
hydraulic pumps which in other autonomous systems are placed on the seabed. But the main feature 
of this concept is the possibility for the subsea system to effectively communicate over long 
distances. Fibre optic communication lines incorporated in the umbilical can transfer high capacity 
data to the surface buoy, which further can communicate with the host by use of radio or satellite  
signal transmissions. See Figure 13 for system overview.  
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Figure 13: The surface moored autonomous buoy concept [28] 
This concept was successfully installed offshore Brazil in 1996 [28]. Long distances to nearby 
platforms and coral reefs along the cost made it economically unfeasible to go for a long distance 
umbilical solution. In this case, solar panels and batteries, hydraulic accumulators, pumps and 
antennas for communication were installed on the buoy. A 500m umbilical providing communication, 
electric and hydraulic power provides energy for actuation of valves and communication with the 
subsea system. A surface moored buoy introduces challenges opposed to complete subsea solutions. 
Especially in regions with harsh weather conditions, the buoy will be subjected to dynamical forces 
which could compromise equipment installed on the buoy. Also the mooring introduce additional 
concerns. Opposed to the other concepts discussed above, critical hardware is easier to access and 
maintain. However, the more hardware is put on the buoy, the bigger and expensive it gets. 
Combinations of the buoy concept and those concepts earlier discussed might be beneficial.  
Autonomous control systems introduce several advantages opposed to conventional control 
systems. The umbilical is one of the most expensive parts of a subsea system and marginal projects 
may be economical unfeasible due to expensive, long offsets. The fact is that the perfect subsea 
control system would not include an umbilical, but be fully autonomous. Autonomous control 
systems introduce several advantages. Not only is it umbilical-less, but it minimize topside control 
system features. It has been over 30 years since research and development of autonomous control 
systems became serious business; however, during the last decade they have not been widely used 
[18]. Limitations in communications are one of the main reasons. In addition it has been augmented 
that the additional required hardware limits the scope of reducing costs and introduces additional 
risks. On the other side, much have happened within communication technology and electrical 
systems the recent years, which are technologies that could be used in modern autonomous control 
systems. Combinations of electric and autonomous technology could prove to be a cost efficient 
alternative for some subsea projects.  
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2.3.4 Subsea Control Module 
 
The subsea control module (SCM) controls the hydraulic functions of the subsea system and is the 
interface for signals and control between topside and subsea equipment. The SCM type depends on 
whether the control system is EH, direct hydraulic or all electric. The most common type today is EH, 
but also the all-electric (ESCM) system is advancing. Figure 14 show a typical EH SCM configuration.  
 
Figure 14: E/H control module configuration [11] 
All hydraulic output functions are operated by electromechanically operated solenoid valves. When 
the solenoid (electromagnet) is energized or de-energized, it either opens or closes a valve orifice. 
Several types of solenoid valves and operation methods exist, but two general principles are: Direct 
acting and internally piloted. Direct acting opens or closes the valve by direct action of the core. This 
operational method has limitations in force and cannot manage high pressures. The internally piloted 
method uses line pressure to assist operations, thereby allowing a small solenoid valve to manage 
high pressures [29].  
A good review of subsea control module functions was given by Bavidge [30]. The SCM receives both 
low pressure (LP) and high pressure (HP) hydraulics  from the guide base through the hydraulic 
couplers mounted on the underside of the SCM. The LP circuit is used to provide pilot pressure for 
the operation of HP solenoid valves. When entering the SCM, both circuits pass a filter followed up 
by  a solenoid operated selector valve, shear seal valve and a shuttle valve. LP and HP accumulators 
are mounted on the SCM and are connected to the hydraulic circuit downstream of the shuttle 
valves. From here, a variety of functional valves like chokes, seal valves, etc. may be operated by 
redundant solenoids. For improved reliability, two Subsea Electronics Modules (SEM) are installed 
inside one atmosphere vessels. The space surrounding the SEMs is filled with dielectric fluid which 
provides an additional barrier against seawater. If the SCM was the leader of the subsea system, the 
SEM would be the brain of the leader. It utilizes multiplexed electronic signals to communicate with 
the SPCU. Commands are given the SEM from the SPCU to perform hydraulic functions by energizing 
20 
 
solenoid valves. The SEM also receives and distributes signals from monitors within the SCM and the 
subsea system. This information could be pressures, temperatures, valve positions, flow rates and so 
on.  
With today’s technology SCM’s cannot be “designed out of maintenance”. A review conducted by 
Chevron identified that there was close to a three-year mean time to failure (MTTF) of SCM’s, and a 
95,5 % probability of failure within 10 years [31]. Thus introduces the SCM one of the most 
considerable reliability challenges of a subsea system. Hence is the SCM normally designed to be 
retrievable by use of ROV assisted running tools.  
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2.4 Subsea Power  
 
To operate and control subsea systems they need continuous supply of power. For conventional 
control systems (section 2.3.1) both hydraulic and electric power are required. The electric power is 
required for sensors and signal transmissions (and other electrical functions), and hydraulic power is 
required to actuate valves. In the All-Electric control system (section 2.3.2), only electric power is 
required. The power supply is traditionally generated at a host facility and transmitted through 
hydraulic lines and electrical conductors incorporated within an umbilical. A hot topic in the offshore 
oil and gas industry these days, is the electrical cable from shore concept. Projects such as the Martin 
Linge field development [32] and the electrification of the developments at Utsirahøyden [33] 
(among others) implements long distance power transmissions from shore. This eliminates the need 
for gas compressors offshore, hence reducing the environmental impact. When the industry move 
towards subsea processing and long tie-back scenarios (such arctic field developments), this concept 
may be the only feasible alternative. The concept has proved its feasibility and lots of literature 
papers focus on this concept. This section will not focus on long distance subsea power 
transmissions, but local power generation (autonomous technology, section 2.3.3) which eliminates 
the need for a power cable.   
 
2.4.1 Thermo-Electric Generator 
 
The Autonomous Power and Control System (APAC) 
project [26] employed a technology  which utilizes 
the differential temperature between the well flow 
and surrounding water to generate electricity. The 
principle is based on the Seebeck Effect named after 
the German physicist Thomas. J. Seebeck, who 
discovered the phenomena in 1820 [34]. An electric 
circuit made of two dissimilar conductors is jointed 
at both ends. When there is a temperature 
difference in the junctions, an electrical current will 
flow in the circuit (Figure 15). The process is most 
efficient when the temperature difference is large. In 
the APAC project, the thermo electric generator is installed 
in a spool integrated in the flowline. The elements are configured in parallel and series to provide 
adequate power. Two production thermo-electrical generators were built and were capable of 
producing  100W, 70V for a temperature potential of 120 degrees Celsius in the production flow. The 
power is accumulated in a battery bank, so sufficient energy can be provided for peak demands.  
According to the author’s knowledge, no projects have applied the thermo-electric power generation 
technology for any commercial subsea projects. In a gas transportation system, where the 
temperature inside the pipelines is close to the ambient temperature, the potential of generating any 
electric energy is close to zero.    
Figure 15: The Seebeck Effect [99] 
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2.4.2 Sea-Water Battery  
 
The first application of sea-water batteries in a subsea system was in the Subsea Well Autonomous 
Control System (SWACS) project [24] [35]. A prototype autonomous control system was installed on 
the Luna 27 gas well, offshore Crotone in the Mediterranean, in 1987. The well was controlled via a 
3.5km acoustic link to the host facility. A local hydraulic circuit (no tie-back to host) supplied power 
for actuation of valves. An electric pump, initially supported by a lithium battery package, recharged 
the hydraulic accumulators when required. After 18 months, with an average power consumption of 
15W, the battery package was exhausted. For long term applications, the SWACS would require 
periodic substitutions of power from an intervention vessel. This was not considered a cost efficient 
solution and the partners of the project commenced studies looking into other alternatives. 
Among other technologies, sea-water batteries were considered the most suitable for this system.  A 
sea-water battery package consists of cells based on metal anodes and inert cathodes. The 
surrounding sea water is used as electrolyte and oxygen dissolved in the water as oxidant. These cells 
requires continuous supplies of oxygen-rich sea water, hence the structures should be constructed to 
maximize the sea water velocity through the cells [35]. The chemical anode/cathode reaction will 
generate an electric current which in turn can provide the systems power requirements and/or 
charge an electric accumulator (a secondary battery package).  
The sea water battery package installed on the Luna 27 well consisted of six cells, whereas the 
complete package dimensions were 5.2m×3.2m×4.2m (L×B×H). The package was fitted with six guide 
funnels for making it possible to replace the anodes by use of ROV’s. A converter operating at an 
input voltage of 1.1-1.6V from the cells, delivers a voltage output of 27.6V to a lead-acid battery 
package. The buffer-battery supplies the electric pump with sufficient power to recharge the 
hydraulic accumulators when required. For a single satellite well, this solution was concluded to be 
successful. For systems with large power consumptions there are challenges in the capacity of such 
systems [24]. 
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2.4.3 Turbo Generators 
 
The Deep Water Autonomous Multi-Well Production 
Systems (DAMPS) research project was started in 1990 
and completed in 1992 [36]. The project applied the 
local hydraulic circuit technology developed in the 
SWACS project, but focused on a turbo generator for 
local power supplies. The turbo generator architecture 
comprises a separator unit, turbo generator, AC/DC 
converter and control electronics, rechargeable lead 
acid battery package and lubrication accumulators. The 
power generator is installed in a by-pass parallel to the 
production line (Figure 16). Natural gas drives the 
turbine which in turn is connected to the generator by 
means of magnetic coupling. 
As long as sufficient pressure is available in the flow, the capacity of the turbine can be regulated by 
choking the flow or by adding turbine steps. The Energy is stored in a battery package, so sufficient 
energy is available for peak demands (e.g actuation of valves). In the DAMPS project, the generator 
was given a requirement of 700W. This was considered sufficient for continuous operation of control 
functions and recharging of the battery package.  
After a comprehensive testing scheme, the project concluded that the functionality of a low power 
gas driven turbine system for subsea application was feasible. However, for the concept to be 
qualified for commercial subsea projects, field trials are required. Although the concept seems to be 
promising, no subsea projects have applied this technology (according to the authors knowledge). 
Limiting factors may be the cleanness of the fluids and the required pressure differential over the 
expander (which requires a low pressure reservoir or a constant pressure loss in the main stream). 
Also erosional effects could compromise the reliability of the expander, so sufficient separation is 
required. Since 1992, huge steps have been taken towards subsea processing. Referring to the 
Åsgard Subsea Compression project, the compressor which is facing some of the same challenges as 
the turbo generator, has proved its feasibility. In a dry gas transportation system, where the 
cleanness of the fluid is high, erosional effects might not even impose a problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Turbo generator architecture [36]. 
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2.5 Communication 
 
2.5.1 Conventional  Cable Communication 
 
Communication between subsea systems and topside host facilities has traditionally been 
established through copper wires. Copper has been the preferred medium for distribution of 
electrical signals and power due to its high conductivity. However, within the subsea industry, 
limitations in copper wire communication technology do not interact with the advances of subsea 
system complexity and requirements [37]. Advances in subsea processing and comprehensive field 
architectures require large amounts of data and signals to be transferred between topside and 
subsea equipment. The conventional copper wire’s does not provide the required bandwidth for 
reliable operation of such systems.   
The state of the art cable communication technology is currently optical fibre transmission, which 
introduces several advantages compared to copper transmission. Fibre optics are made of pure glass 
(or sometimes plastic) bundled together in a cable. Information is transmitted through the cable by 
use of light signals with little attenuation (Figure 17). This enables high bandwidth transmissions over 
long distances [38]. 
 
Figure 17: Light signals travelling through fibre optics [38] 
The  maximum data transfer of conventional electric (copper) cables is 20 kb/s (maximum 20km step-
out), while fibre optic transmission of signals enables 10 GB/s data transfer in 140km step outs. 
Figure 18 shows the data transfer capacity and step out range for signal cable transmission methods. 
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Figure 18: Data transfer rate and step out range of different data transfer methods [39]. (E) = electrical, (O) = optical 
Another challenge which occurs due to increased subsea complexity is high levels of electromagnetic 
interference (EMI). High power equipment interfering with communication signals is a major 
problem for conventional conductors. However, fibre optic conductors are immune to EMI and 
thereby eliminate the issue. Fibre optic cables are also lighter than its counterpart, hence will the 
umbilical be lighter (and cheaper). But one should notice that fibre optic implementation comes with 
a higher cost due to comprehensive termination activities, and expensive connectors and system 
components [40].  
2.5.2 Wireless  Underwater Communication 
 
The costs and risks associated with underwater cabling make wireless communication an attractive 
alternative. If a subsea system could establish efficient wireless communication with a remote 
located host facility, the benefits would be significant. Basically three methods for wireless 
underwater information transmissions exist today: acoustic, electromagnetic (EM) and use of optical 
waves. In this section their application and limitations in subsea systems will be addressed [41] .   
 
2.5.2.1 Electromagnetic Waves (EM) 
 
Radio waves are electromagnetic radiation travelling through air and vacuum of space by means of 
oscillating electromagnetic fields. Transmitters can transform information into radio waves and send 
them over large distances without significant attenuation. A receiver at the other end picks up the 
wave and transforms it back into its original form [42]. However, efficient underwater radio 
communication is a challenge. Due to the high attenuation in seawater, large distance radio wave 
communication is impractical. As the attenuation increases with conductivity and frequency, only low 
frequency signals are applicable for long distances. Low frequent waves carry little energy, not 
sufficient for communication purpose. Low frequent waves like ULF and VLF have their application in 
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underwater communication (mainly military), but only with very limited data capacity and step-out 
range. Higher frequencies can be used for short range applications like for e.g. AUV’s communicating 
with a subsea base. 
 
2.5.2.2 Acoustic Waves 
 
Acoustic transmission of information relies on propagating sound waves. Acoustic waves propagate 
at a much lower speed than EM and are dependent on factors such as water depth and temperature. 
On the other side, the attenuation in water is much lower than for EM waves. However, implications 
such as multiple paths and ambient noise reduces the reliability of the method. Multiple paths occur 
when the waves reflect on e.g. the sea bottom, and the sensor receives multiple arrivals of the same 
signal, which could introduce challenges in signal interpretation. Sources for ambient noise could be 
marine traffic, breaking waves, marine animals and so on. To avoid interference with signals, noise 
frequency needs to be considered. Even though acoustic wave attenuation is of less degree than EM 
it certainly has its limitations. Its attenuation is a function of absorption, scattering and geometric 
spreading. The absorption rate depends on the travelling medium and wave frequencies. Higher 
frequency means higher attenuation. As the distance from transponder to receiver increases, the 
energy flow will be smaller and the signal will eventually die. Scattering occur when particles in the 
water force the wave to deviate from its trajectory.  
Far distance signals can only be sent with low frequencies; hence the bandwidth is very limited.  
 
2.5.2.3 Optical Waves 
 
Optical waves suffer from rapid absorption in water and scattering caused by particles and planktons. 
Thereby is communication by optical waves not considered feasible for long distances. High data rate 
transmissions can be achieved by sensors located close to each other.  
 
2.5.3 Through Flow-line Communication 
 
In the previous sections, wireless communication based on acoustic and electromagnetic wave 
technologies were discussed. These concepts are based on direct transmission of signals through 
open water which introduces several reliability challenges. Through flow-line communication is a 
concept utilizing the flow line itself as an acoustic communication link between the host and subsea 
system. Most subsea systems are in some way managing the operation of flow-lines, so they are 
always present and ready for use. 
A research project named Deep Water Autonomous Multi-well Production System (DAMPS) were 
initiated in 1990 and completed in 1991 [43]. The communication between the host and subsea 
system was based on the “through flow-line” concept. The fluid contained inside the flow-lines was 
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utilized to guide pressure signals made by a wave generator. The signals were received and decoded 
at the other end. The signals are protected against the external environment, so its limitations lie in 
the  transmission medium. Different flow regimes and flow-line sizes will affect the signal 
attenuation. The project concluded that the transmission of sinusoidal pressure waves through two-
phase fluids was possible, even at large step-outs. In a single-phase fluid the communication distance 
can easily exceed 10km, but the data capacity is very limited.   
 
 
2.5.4 Communication summary 
 
Table 1: Summary of different subsea communication methods for long step-out range 
Method Copper cable  Fiber optic cable Radio waves Acoustic waves 
Data capacity  Low Very high Very low  Very low 
Maximum 
transmission 
range* 20km 140km 100m 50km 
Advantages 
Proven technology,  
High speed, 
Cheap, 
Long step-out 
range, 
Easier 
terminations, 
Proven Technology, 
Immune to EMI, 
Ultra- long step-out 
range, 
High speed, 
Infield 
communication  
opportunities, 
no termination 
interface, 
no umbilical 
Infield 
communication 
opportunities, 
no termination 
interface, 
no umbilical, 
lower 
attenuation of 
signal 
Disadvantages 
Vulnerable to EMI,  
High attenuation of  
signal, 
Heavier and more  
expensive 
umbilical, 
 
 
  
Harder terminations, 
Complex connectors, 
Large costs 
Very high  
attenuation of 
signal, 
Not applicable 
for long step-
outs 
susceptible to 
ambient noise, 
reflection of 
signals, 
poor reliability 
for long step-
outs 
* These values should not be emphasized since they vary in different sources.  
The reliability of the wire-less communication is also of great concern in long 
step-outs   
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2.6 Subsea Adjustable Choke Valves 
 
The control of flow is a requirement to obtain safe, flexible and reliable operations of subsea 
systems. This control is achieved by using choke valves, in some context referred to as control valves 
or flow control valves. Choke valves offer several advantages for subsea systems [44], [45]. In subsea 
production systems the use of choke valves allows high pressure wellhead flow to enter pressure 
restricted pipelines. In some cases the volume of the flow can be choked down to meet the separator 
capacity of the topside. In a gas transportation system it may be desired to regulate one main flow 
into several branching flows. This is all obtained operating a choke/control valve.  
The basic principle of choke valves is that fluids are forced to flow through a reduced area which can 
be either fixed or adjustable. Different choke valve configurations exist, but the principle is always 
the same. When fluids are forced through a reduced area, the laws of fluids dynamics show that the 
velocity of the fluid will increase (see equations 1 and  2).  
Q1 = Q2                                        (1) 
A1*V1 = A2*V2                                            (2) 
  
 
 + g*z + 
  
 
   = Constant        (3) 
Where:  
Q = Volume flow [m3] 
A = Cross sectional area [m2] 
V = Velocity [m/s] 
P = Pressure [Pa] 
ρ = Density [kg/m3] 
g = Gravity constant [m/s2] 
z = Height [m] 
 
The Bernoulli’s principle (equation 3) shows that when the velocity increases, the pressure will fall. In 
a choke valve, when passing through the restricted area, the fluids will accelerate and the turbulence 
intensity will increase which results in a permanent pressure drop [46]. Most of the power will be 
dissipated as heat, but a significant amount is also produced as sound or pressure oscillations [47]. 
Choke valves are operated by actuators and can be either fixed or adjustable. Adjustable choke 
valves change their capacities by manoeuvring the valve stem. Since there are a variety of different 
trim designs, the flow characteristics of choke valves are not always linear (Figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Choke valve flow characteristics [48] 
The capacity of choke valves is often described by the flow coefficient Cv which is a measure that 
combines the flow rate and pressure drop across the valve (equation 4). 
     √
  
  
                      (4) 
Where: 
 
Q = Volume flow 
SG = Specific gravity 
   = Pressure drop across valve 
 
Choke valves are characterised by manufacturers by an available Cv  and a minimum Cv, hence the 
operational area must be within these values.  
 
Choke valves can be installed on manifolds or X-mas trees permanently or as retrievable modules. 
These modules, often referred to as flow control modules may also incorporate flow meters, 
pressure transmitters and other instrumentations. From a reliability point of view, choke valves have 
been a major concern in subsea systems due to though working conditions. Erosion, abrasion and 
cavitation damage are critical issues which need to be considered in the choke design [45]. Large 
velocities in combination with changes from one phase to two phase fluid and impurities such as 
sand can damage the trim. Hence, the nature of the fluids needs to be considered in the design of 
the choke. The local pressure variations due to the turbulent flow, generate noise which propagate 
downstream of the choke as acoustical pressure waves [47]. If not dampened out, these pressure 
waves can cause vibrations which in combination with resonant effects of supporting structures can  
yield high cyclic stresses. Hence, dynamical analyses which consider all operational scenarios of the 
choke should be conducted. Another phenomenon which could in some choke applications cause 
problems, is the Joule-Thomson Effect. The Joule-Thomson Effect is the change in temperature of a 
fluid upon pressure decrease [49]. When the pressure decreases over the choke, depending on the 
extent of the pressure fall, the temperature will decrease. Normally the drawdown pressures of 
subsea chokes (well chokes) are not of such extent that this effect has any direct practical impact on 
the system [50]. However flow assurance problems (hydrates, wax) and icing of surrounding 
equipment may in some cases (if certain conditions are met) introduce challenges in choke valve 
applications.   
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Figure 20: Flow Through a single seat, two-port globe valve [97] 
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2.7 Actuators 
 
Subsea valves can be operated by ROV’s, divers or by means of remote actuation. Basically three 
remote valve actuation methods exist in the industry: Hydraulic, pneumatic and electric. Hydraulic 
actuators are considered the conventional method for subsea use. Hydraulic power is converted into 
mechanical work by means of a hydraulic cylinder or a hydraulic motor. This mechanical work is 
utilized to operate the valve positions. Since the liquids utilized in hydraulic circuits are nearly 
incompressible, hydraulic cylinders can provide precise displacements and thereby good valve 
control [51]. Pneumatic actuation suffers from the compressibility of gases and will not be given any 
further attention in this thesis. As discussed in section 2.3, the benefits of All-Electric control systems 
are many and electric valve actuation is a requirement for these systems. Hence will the focus lay on 
electric valve actuators.  
Electric subsea actuators are field proven on the Norne and Statfjord fields in the North Sea [52]. 
Their functions are the same as for conventional actuators, but they introduce the benefits of no 
hydraulic components. FMC’s actuator concept comprises Electrical Subsea Control Modules (ESCM) 
and rechargeable Li-Ion batteries in addition to the actuator. The electric actuator consists basically 
of a communication unit, an Electric motor and a gear box incorporated within the actuator housing. 
It’s operation is controlled from the ESCM. The batteries accumulate sufficient power to drive the 
electromotor when valve operations are required. These are rechargeable, thus allowing a low power 
cable to charge the batteries in between operations.  
State of the art electric actuators can provide the fail safe functions which may be required in a 
subsea production system [21]. These actuators consist of a drive motor and a clutch motor. The 
drive motor forces the valve to open against a spring. When the valve is in open position, the drive 
motor stops and the clutch motor ensures that the valve remains open. This clutch motor requires 
only small amounts of power to hold the position. If the power supply is interrupted, the clutch drive 
loses power and the valve will fail to its safe position.  
Electric actuators are proven technology for subsea use. Their range of applicability covers all areas 
where its conventional hydraulic counterpart is applied. They have however, not been widely used. 
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2.8 Subsea Pigging 
 
Subsea pipelines require periodic inspection and internal maintenance to verify the integrity of the 
transportation system. This is most efficiently achieved by employing a pig (a scraping tool). Different 
pigs are employed for different purposes. Maintenance pigs are used to remove wax or scale 
formations which may cause flow assurance problems. Inspection pigs, also referred to as intelligent 
pigs, are used to detect deviations in the pipeline design as a result from e.g. corrosion. The 
maintenance pig is normally run prior to the inspection pig to remove debris and to verify the 
“pigability” of the pipeline. Traditionally the Magnetic Flux Leakage Technology has been used for 
inline inspection  of gas pipelines [53], but a new method using acoustic technology is currently being 
developed [54]. In pipelines where high accuracy of measurements is required, an ultra-sonic pig is 
run in a liquid batch isolated by two isolation pigs in both ends. The liquid batch is required as a 
medium for this method to be feasible.    
A pipeline pigging operation is conducted by inserting the pig in a pig launcher at one end of the 
pipeline and is retrieved in a pig receiver at the other end. Traditionally, the pig launcher and receiver 
is installed on topside facilities (platform or onshore). The pig can be launched and received at the 
same facility (round-trip pigging), or launched at one facility and received at another (see Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21: Conventional surface pig launching and receiving concepts [55] 
The surface to surface configurations is not always 
technical feasible in a project, particularly in subsea 
developments. Single flow line subsea developments 
may require the pig to be either launched or received 
subsea (or both launched and received in rare cases), 
since a round-trip configuration cannot be 
economically justified [56]. The subsea pig launcher 
concept comprises a fixed arrangement on a 
template or integrated in a manifold which the 
temporary pig launcher can be mated with. When a 
pig operation campaign is conducted, an intervention 
vessel will use a guiding system, assisted by ROV’s to 
install the launcher (Figure 22) [55]. The mating of 
the launcher and the subsea arrangement can be 
Figure 22: Intervention vessel deploying pig launcher [59] 
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either vertically oriented (Figure 23) or horizontally oriented. Vertically oriented systems are easier 
to deploy and represents a more compact structure, but horizontal systems allows the deployment 
of a larger launchers. One of the world’s largest subsea pig launch operations was conducted at the 
Åsgard field in 2004 [57]. A multi-diameter(28/42 inch) pig (horizontally oriented) was launched 
successfully in 300m water depth and was traveling 684km from the Åsgard export riser base to the 
Kårstø processing facility. An example of a subsea pig launch procedure is given below [58]. 
The pig is installed within the pig launcher in advance of deployment. Before the launcher is 
deployed, a leak test of the isolation valve is conducted and the pressure cap is removed (see Figure 
24). When the integrity of the seal is verified, the launcher is lowered to the guide base by  a crane 
and guiding wires. When fitted at the guiding base, the wires are disconnected and the launcher is 
stroked into the hub with a torque tool. The connection is leak tested by injecting MEG through a 
hose deployed from the vessel. When integrity once again is verified, the isolation valve is opened by 
means of ROV actuation. A second hose is deployed from the vessel and connected to the pig 
launcher. This hose contains fluid (e.g. MEG or Naphtha) which is pumped into the launcher to force 
the pig into the pipeline. From this point, the pig follows the gas flow and is retrieved at the pig 
receiver facility. Note that this is an example of a subsea pig launcher procedure, other procedures 
probably exists for other configurations.  
 
Figure 23: Vertically oriented subsea pig launcher concept by Chevron. The pig launcher is vertically mated with the 
subsea structure [59]. 
 
Figure 24: Simplified subsea pig launcher configuration (horizontally oriented) 
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2.9 Pressure Protection 
 
Subsea pipelines have traditionally been designed to the meet the maximum pressure of a system to 
assure safe transportation of hydrocarbons. This restriction has made high pressure/ high 
temperature reservoirs economical marginal to develop due to the need for high specification 
pipelines [60]. In the 1990’s effort was put into developing a system which safely allows a high 
pressure flow to enter a pressure restricted pipeline (or equipment). This system is today known as 
the subsea High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS). By continuously monitoring the 
pipeline pressure, an automatic sequence will close two isolation valves if the pressure rises above 
what is allowed in the pressure restricted pipeline. Figure 25 gives a basic overview of the HIPPS 
arrangement. 
 
Figure 25: HIPPS arrangement comprising two barrier valves (isolation valves), three pressure transmitters and a HIPPS 
Subsea Control Module controlling its functions [61]. 
 
Three pressure transmitters are continuously communicating with the Subsea Electronic Module 
(SEM) incorporated within the SCM housing. The SEM is the decision maker which compares the 
signals from the transmitters with the operational threshold. If two out of three transmitters exceed 
the threshold, the SEM automatically initiates a shutdown sequence, which closes the barrier valves 
and isolates the downstream pipeline [61]. Under normal operational conditions the flow is 
controlled by a choke (see section 2.6) which regulates the flow based on pressure measurements.  
To justify the implementation of a HIPPS opposed to a conventional design, the reliability of the 
system is crucial. The HIPPS control system is to a large degree independent of the subsea control 
system controlling the other subsea system functions [60]. Only the umbilical and umbilical 
termination and distribution unit are shared with the subsea control system. In addition, redundancy 
is provided for all components such as pressure transmitters, SEM and valves.  
The design of a HIPPS system should comply with the international standards IEC 61508 and IEC 
61511. These standards give requirements for specifications, design, installation, operation and 
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maintenance of safety instrumented systems, “so that it can be confidently entrusted to place and/or 
maintain the process in a safe state” [61]. IEC 61508 gives a risk based approach for deciding the 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) required for Safety Instrumented Systems [62].  
Table 2: Safety Integrity Levels for safety functions operating on demand or in a continuous demand mode [62] 
 
 
A specific approach for deciding the SIL rate of a HIPPS is not given. But projects such as the Kristin 
Field development on the NCS have used the IEC 61508 standard and decided that SIL 3 rate is 
required for a HIPPS [63]. A SIL 3 rate sets strict requirements to reliability, redundancy and fail-safe 
functions of all components. In addition, a comprehensive operational testing scheme is required on 
a continuous basis to document the probability of failure on demand (see Table 2). Once every year, 
a full functional test of the HIPPS system is required. At the Kristin project, the functionality of the 
system is verified by isolating two of the pressure transmitters from the control room, while two 
other transmitters verifies that the valves have closed.  The second step is to re-open the isolation 
valves, relieve the up-stream pressure in the manifold and re-pressurize above the threshold 
pressure by injecting MEG. The signals from all pressure sensors should then initiate the shutdown 
sequence. In addition, a leak test is conducted. Also, every second month the operators of Kristin 
conducts a test where the isolation valves are closed 20%, to verify their functionality. This test is 
conducted during operation and has no significant impact on production. This data is used to 
continuously calculating the reliability of the system.  
HIPPS  systems have not been widely used in subsea systems since it first was implemented on Shells 
Kingfisher project in 1997. In 2010, 11 subsea HIPPS had been installed [61]. Mainly three reasons are 
believed to be the reason why operators do not implement this solution in their projects [64].  
- The possibility to bleed down the upstream pressure is limited subsea. This could lead to the 
formation of hydrate plugs if the valves are closed over an extended period. When the HIPPS 
valves are re-opened, they do so with a full differential pressure which could lead to 
erosional wear inside the isolation valve. This problem could be solved by adding a relief line 
or a bypass relief choke, but such additional features make the system even more complex. 
- IMR tasks associated with the HIPPS are difficult and expensive 
- To keep the reliability confidence high, regular testing of the system is required. The full 
functional test (discussed above) which is required to conduct once a year, means a full shut-
down of the system. The pressure test involving MEG injection introduces another 
complication which must be dealt with. 
HIPPS systems are not considered conventional technology, although their applications in subsea 
systems are proven with successful implementation in several projects. This technology enables high 
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pressure reservoirs to be developed without the additional costs of thick walled flowlines and riser to  
safely meet the high pressures. It also enables existing low(er) pressure rated pipelines to meet high 
pressure systems. 
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3. Heimdal Subsea System 
 
In chapter 2 relevant subsea technologies are identified and discussed. The further work focus on the 
application of these technologies in a subsea gas transition hub.  
3.1 Functional Requirements  
  
The case assumes that Heimdal processing is shut down and that the topside facilities at Heimdal will 
be by-passed as illustrated in Figure 26. A 36’’  bi-directional pipeline will be installed connecting 
Oseberg to Draupner. A branching spool will connect the Oseberg-Daupner (OGT-DRP) system 
together with Vesterled in a subsea manifold. The Vesterled pipeline will be connected  directly to 
the manifold. This lay-out will allow the OGT-DRP pipeline to by-pass the subsea manifold in the pre-
installation phase or in events (such as maintenance campaigns) where the subsea system is out of 
operation. 
 
Figure 26: Heimdal area overview. The red lines indicates the current arrangement of pipelines, while the black lines are 
the future arrangement when Heimdal is by-passed. 
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An overview of the pipelines specifications is given in Table 3. Note that assumptions have been 
made. The risks of over pressuring the Vesterled pipeline from the Oseberg and Draupner facilities 
sets requirements to a pressure protection system. If the pressure in OGT-DRP exceeds the Vesterled 
design pressure, a choke/control valve will choke the flow to meet the requirements. In normal 
operations, the pressure in OGT-DRP is not expected to exceed the Vesterled design pressure. A 
pressure protection system is however required to give a satisfying safety level.  
  
Table 3: Overview of the pipelines capacities, design pressures and outer diameters. * It is assumed that  pipeline which 
today connects Heimdal to DRP can be upgraded to the same level as OGT. The capacity of 35 MSm
3
/day at OGT-DRP 
may possibly be upgraded if a new design study is initiated. 
 
To maintain the flexibility in gas transportation the topside facility has today, a manifold comprising 
control functions and safety systems will be installed on the seabed. In chapter two, applicable 
technologies are discussed and in the next sections, a subsea gas transition hub concept will be 
presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pipeline Hydraulic capacity 
[MSm3/day] 
Design Pressure [barg] Diameter [inches] 
Oseberg-Draupner* 35 190 36 
Vesterled 39.9 148.9 32 
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3.2  Subsea concept 
 
Going subsea introduces several challenges compared to conventional topside solutions. The harsh 
environment and remote location requires high reliability of components for the concept to be 
justified. This section will evaluate the applications of technologies discussed in section 2 and in the 
end, give a recommendation for a subsea concept.  
3.3 Manifold 
 
The manifold is the structural foundation for pipelines, control equipment and safety systems which 
are required to operate the system with high integrity. It is desirable to minimize the weight and  the 
size of the manifold since the costs of manufacturing and installation are very dependent of these 
factors. The installation costs represents a significant amount of the overall costs of a subsea 
manifold, the installation should therefore be continuously evaluated in the design process. This 
should include identification of installation vessels with adequate crane capacities, planning of 
marine operations and identification of risks associated with the installation. The manifold will host 
equipment which needs periodic maintenance; hence should these components be modularized so 
that they can be separately retrieved. Easy access for ROV’s will make interventions more efficient 
and thereby save operational costs. The manifold will be installed on a subsea template (with 
protection structure) which provides the foundation on the seabed in addition to protection against 
impact loads such as from fish trawlers or dropped objects. If feasible, the structure comprising 
template, manifold arrangement and equipment modules should be installed in one lift. 
A Piping and Instrumentation diagram (P&ID) of the manifold and its interfaces are presented in 
Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27: P&ID of the subsea manifold  
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The OGT-DRP by-pass is supposed to be installed with two tees. One tee for possible future tie-ins 
and one for the tie-in to the subsea manifold. The manifold arrangement includes seven valves: two 
HIPPS valves, four isolation valves and one choke/control valve. The Choke valve controls the flow by 
means of remote actuation. This allows the gas flow in OGT-DRP to be branched into two separate 
directions (to Draupner and Vesterled). Two isolation valves are required in case of maintenance or 
to retrieve the flow control (choke) module. To satisfy the pigging requirements, a subsea pig-
launcher arrangement will be incorporated within the manifold. This system is based on diver-less 
deployment of the pig-launcher, hence only one isolation valve in front of the launcher is required. 
However, two isolation valves will be implemented for increased reliability of the seal (see more in  
section 3.8). A HIPPS comprising two isolation/barrier valves and separate control system is installed 
to protect the Vesterled pipeline from being over-pressured by the Oseberg and Draupner facilities. 
The manifold will also support the control systems equipment and additional instrumentation. 
To reduce the weight of the manifold, it is beneficial to reduce the diameter of the piping. This is also 
beneficial with respect to valve sizing, since large pipelines introduce the requirements of large 
valves and actuators.  
When sizing gas pipelines, NORSOK P-001 states that the sizing criteria will be a compromise 
between maximum allowable velocity and allowable pressure drop [65]. Where the pressure drop is 
not critical, the gas velocity should not exceed limits which may create noise or vibrations problems. 
The velocity should be kept below: 
       (
 
 
)
    
              (5) 
Where: 
V – Velocity [m/s] 
   – Density of gas [kg/m3] 
 
Data retrieved from SCADA (Appendix A) shows that the maximum density of the gas is 
approximately 170 kg/m3. Substituting the density into (5) gives: 
       (
 
   
)
    
= 19.23 m/s 
which is the maximum allowable velocity of the gas.  
By assuming that the gas volume flow is constant, the gas velocity in a reduced pipeline can be 
calculated: 
Q1 = Q2                                    (6) 
A1×V1 = A2×V2 
    
     
  
   (6b) 
 
Where: 
Q – Volume flow [m3/s] 
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V1 – Inlet velocity [m/s] 
V2 – Velocity in reduced diameter pipeline [m/s] 
A1 = Cross sectional area of pipeline [m2] 
A2 = Cross sectional area of reduced diameter pipeline [m2] 
 
The maximum velocity measured at Heimdal reporting point (from Oseberg) (Figure A 2) is: V1 = 3.56 
m/s with a cross sectional area of 0,65m2 (36 inch pipeline). The Velocity in the reduced area is 
calculated with different pipeline diameters, see Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Velocity in reduced area pipeline as a function of pipeline diameters 
 
 
The 16 inch pipeline is thus the lowest allowable pipeline diameter when comparing with the 
NORSOK gas velocity criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pipeline diameter 
[inches] 
Velocity, V2 
[m/s] 
8 73,9 
10 47,3 
12 32,9 
14 24,1 
16 18,5 
18 14,6 
20 11,8 
22 9,8 
24 8,2 
26 7,0 
28 6,0 
30 5,3 
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3.4 Control system 
 
The subsea control systems function is to control and operate the subsea system with high reliability 
and integrity. Conventional subsea systems are based on hydraulic actuation of valves. The state of 
the art within hydraulic  subsea control systems is the MUX EH (section 2.3.1). This systems has 
proved to be reliable and fast responding in numerous subsea projects the last years. However, it has 
its limitations with respect to long offsets, deep waters, fluid storage capacity and reliability of 
hydraulic components. The recent years, the development of All-Electric control systems has 
advanced (section 2.3.2). This control systems relies on electric actuators (section 2.7) to operate 
valves, thus  eliminates the challenges related to hydraulic systems. The control system establishes 
contact between the host facility and the subsea system. This connection is normally established 
through an umbilical which incorporates hydraulic lines (if hydraulic control system), fibre optics for 
communication and electric conductors which energizes the electrical components of the system. 
The umbilical is one of the largest expenses in subsea developments. In the North Sea, trawling 
activity sets requirements for the umbilical to be trenched, which is very costly. It will however 
always be a risk for umbilical rupture which would put the subsea system out of operation. Hence, 
have much effort been put into developing umbilical-less control systems, or in this case referred to 
as Autonomous Control systems (section 2.3.3). Although several projects have concluded fully 
autonomous control systems to be feasible alternatives to conventional control systems, they have 
their limitations with respect to reliable communication.  
The advantages of All-Electric control systems are evident opposed to the conventional hydraulic 
systems. A hydraulic control system would set requirements to a hydraulic fluid storage unit and 
pumps at a nearby host facility. This will probably be very challenging due to the already limited 
storage capacity at offshore platforms. All-Electric control system eliminates the requirements of 
hydraulics, but still requires solutions for communication and electric energy. The conventional 
concept for communication and energy supply would be an umbilical which incorporates fibre optics 
and electric cables. This will again create a dependency of third party offshore platforms and the risk 
and costs associated with the umbilicals are still present (although at a somewhat lower cost).  
For the case of the Heimdal subsea system, it must be appreciated that the power demands are low 
compared to large subsea production systems. This system requires energy for actuation of the 
choke valve and instruments, opposed to several Xmas-trees and manifolds in subsea production 
systems. It may be hard to justify the risks and costs associated with a long step-out umbilical for the 
Heimdal subsea system.  
A combination of autonomous energy supply and the All-Electric control system is considered a more 
commercially realistic and cost efficient alternative. The control system will be powered by a 
rechargeable lithium Ion battery package (discussed further in section 3.5), thus eliminating the need 
for a power cable. Once every two years, an intervention vessel will recharge the battery package as 
a part of the maintenance strategy for the system. The All-Electric control system comprises an 
Electric Power and Communication Distribution Unit (EPCDU) and an Electric Subsea Control module 
(SCM). The EPCDU regulates and distributes the energy from the battery package further to the SCM. 
The SCM is the interface for signal transmissions and controls of the electric actuator between the 
subsea system and the master control station. Communication between the subsea system and the 
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control centre is established through the integrated fibre optic cable network in the North Sea 
(section 3.6). An overview of the recommended subsea  control concept is presented in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28: Recommended subsea control system concept overview 
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3.5 Power  
3.5.1 Subsea power concept selection 
 
The All-Electric control system eliminates the need for hydraulic energy to actuate valves. Power for 
actuation of the choke valve, in addition to the functions of the subsea control module is provided by 
an electric power source. In section 2.4, different local power generation methods were discussed.  
The Thermo-Electric Generator (section 2.4.1) which utilizes temperature differences in the gas to 
generate electricity is not considered feasible for this system. The temperature in the gas will 
probably be close to the ambient seawater temperature, and small potential for electric power 
generation is available.  
The turbo generator (section 2.4.3) is a promising concept for local power generation. Why not utilize 
the available high pressure gas in the pipeline to generate electricity? The turbo generator could be 
installed in a by-pass on the manifold. Small volumes of gas could be routed through the by-pass line 
into an expander which in turn is connected to a generator. There are several challenges however, to 
overcome before this concept can be implemented into the Heimdal Subsea System. A low pressure 
reservoir downstream of the expander would be required, or alternatively, a constant pressure loss 
in the main stream (from e.g. a venturi or a choke valve) to ensure a differential pressure over the 
expander. And also, there are challenges with respect to the regularity of such systems, it needs to 
be functional for different pressures and flow rates. The DAMPS project [36] concluded that this 
concept was technical feasible for a subsea system. However, the concept has not been commercially 
qualified. It is recommended that Gassco look further into this concepts technology and its 
limitations. The concept would require comprehensive testing and qualification work to obtain 
acceptable functionality and reliability, and it will not (at least for now) be recommended as a local 
power generation source. 
In section 2.4.2 the sea-water battery was discussed. This local power generation concept relies on a 
chemical anode/cathode reaction to generate electricity. The technology of sea-water batteries has 
successfully been applied in a subsea satellite gas-well development in the Ionian Sea and in 3 
seismic stations offshore Japan. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) did in 2005 a 
study on behalf of Norsk Hydro, where the  feasibility of subsea energy supply was investigated [66]. 
Among other technologies, the sea-water battery was considered the most reliable and cost efficient 
alternative. Each cell consists of a magnesium anode surrounded by carbon fibre cathodes. The 
capacity of each cell is to a large degree dependent of the sea current. A load of 2 W per meter cell 
(W/m) was concluded to be the ideal load on each cell. The lifetime of each 2 W/m cell is 2-3 years. 
The sea-water battery recommended by FFI consists of 100 cells with the dimensions 6m height and 
800mm diameter. Each cell is equipped with  a DC to DC converter and a buffer accumulator (e.g. 
Lithium Ion battery), which in turn is connected to a common 24V hub. Each DC to DC converter is 
capable of providing 15W resulting in a total battery capacity of 1500W. A battery package could 
consist of four modules, each supporting 25 cell modules. The distance between each cell module 
should be 1m, hence will one (of four) battery modules be 10 × 10 × 7-8m (Width × Length × height). 
The total weight of each module would be somewhere around 35 tons, so each module can be 
installed and retrieved as one unit. The dimensions of the battery package may introduce challenges 
with respect to the requirements of protection structures due to trawling activity in the area. Also 
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installation and maintenance activities could be challenging (and costly). Sea-water batteries with 
lower capacities and somewhat proportional lower dimensions could be designed for the Heimdal 
Subsea System. The technology is tried and ready for implementation (some qualification work is 
probably required), and it is considered the best alternative for local subsea power generation.  
Out of the three local electric power generation methods the sea-water battery is the most 
promising. It is however not considered conventional technology. Large structural dimensions and 
uncertainties in performance of such systems are risk factors that must be avoided.  
If the local subsea power generation concepts are excluded, there are two options left: Electric cable 
from an offshore topside host facility (or from shore), or a secondary (rechargeable) battery which 
can provide the required energy for a specified period. A combination of these could also be an 
alternative. A low energy power cable (which is cheaper than a high power cable) could charge a 
battery when the systems energy demands are low. When the energy demands peak, the battery can 
provide the required capacity.  
A subsea rechargeable lithium ion battery will be the recommended concept for the subsea power 
supply. The electric cable concept would be the safe and conventional choice for the power supply. 
However, due to the relatively low power consumption of the Heimdal Subsea System, a battery 
package (with no connection to a host facility) is a cost efficient alternative. Every two years, an 
invention vessel will recharge the battery package with a cable deployed from the vessel. The 
following section demonstrates the dimensioning of the battery. 
 
 
3.5.2 Rechargeable Lithium Ion Battery 
  
In order to estimate the required battery capacity, the systems power consumption must be decided. 
This cannot accurately be calculated at this stage of the study, however, simplified estimates will be 
given. The battery shall provide the control system with adequate power to fulfil its functional 
requirements. This comprises continuous transmissions of command and control signals, in addition 
to actuation of the choke valve. The electric actuator consists basically of an electric motor and a 
gearing system. The electric motor generates a rotating movement (a torque) which needs to be 
converted into linear motion. This conversion is achieved by using lead screws such as  the acme 
screw, a ball screw or the roller screw [67]. Roller screws have better efficiency than acme screws 
and can carry larger loads than the ball screws. For the further calculations, an electric actuator 
arrangement comprising an electric motor and a roller screw will be used. Note that the calculations 
are simplified.  
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Figure 29: Roller Screw arrangement [68] 
The electric motor generates a torque which is converted into a linear force by the roller screw. This 
linear force is utilized to manoeuvre the valve position. How much force is required to change the 
valve position depends mainly of the bore size and the pressure within the valve. Figure 30 shows the 
forces the actuator must overcome.   
 
Figure 30: A valve/actuator arrangement showing the frictional and pressure forces caused by the inner pressure Pi. 
An equation for calculating the force required to change the valve position is shown below (1). This 
equation is simplified and does not consider the gearing arrangement and the systems friction. See 
Appendix B for assumptions (Table B 1) and calculations. 
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Where: 
Pi – Internal Pressure [Pa] 
a  – Stem cross sectional area [m2] 
Ff – Vertical force on the valve block [N] 
  – Friction Coefficient  
 
The pressure inside the valve will create a vertical force on the valve block which in turn creates a 
horizontal frictional force. The vertical force is found by equation (2). 
 
 
                                                                                                  
Where : 
   – is the differential pressure over the valve [Pa] 
A – Valves cross sectional area [m2 ] 
 
From (2) it is observed that a large    results in large frictional forces. 
The required torque applied on the roller screw to overcome the load F is given by the relation [69]: 
 
   
   
     
                                                                        
Where:  
S – Screw lead [m] 
  – Motor efficiency  
 
Further, the required power from the electric motor can be calculated by the relation (4): 
                                                                                         
Where the angular velocity  is given by (5). 
   
    
  
     
   
 
                                                                       
 
And n is the speed, rounds per minute (rpm). 
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The actuators power consumption is to a large degree dependent of the pressure differential across 
the valve. This can be observed from Figure 31 . 
 
Figure 31: The actuators total power consumption as a function of the differential pressure across the valve over two 
years. See appendix B,  Table B 2 – B4 and  Table B 7 for calculations. The assumptions are given in Table B 1. 
The pressure differential is not expected to reach large values, even when the valve is to be actuated 
from fully closed position. For the further calculations, a ΔP = 10 bar is assumed (which may be 
conservative). A pressure differential of 10 bar and an inner pressure Pi of 150 bar, requires a 10kW 
electric motor to change the valve position.  
Calculations show that the largest power consumer of this system is not the electric actuator, but the 
continuous power supply required by sensors and signals transmissions etc. The SWACS project [24] 
used a continuous power consumption of 20 W for the calculations. From Figure 32 it can be 
observed that the required battery capacity (and mass) increases rapidly when the continuous power 
supply increases.  
 
Figure 32: The required battery capacity/mass as a function of the continuous power consumption. See Table B 9 in 
Appendix B for calculations. 
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Comparing with the SWACS project, a continuous power consumption of 100 W is assumed for the 
further calculations. This may be conservative, but should provide safety in calculations and balance 
uncertainties.    
With an average ΔP = 10 bar, a continuous power consumptions of 100W and the assumptions given 
in Table B 1, the required battery capacity is 1903 kWh over two years. However, the self-discharging 
rechargeable batteries experience must be considered. Lithium Ion batteries has a low self-discharge 
rate compared to other rechargeable batteries (about 1.5% per month [70]). A self-discharge rate of 
3 % is assumed for this case. 
Table B 8 shows that to account for the batteries self-discharging, a factor of 1.4 can be multiplied 
with the required capacity. This results in a total required battery capacity of 2664 kWh. 
Lithium ion batteries contains from 80 to 220 Wh/kg [71] [72]. Hence, the mass of the battery 
package (excluding protection structures and the battery container) will be in the region from 13.3 
tons to 33.3 tons. A 20 tons lithium Ion rechargeable battery package should have the capacity to 
provide the Heimdal subsea system with sufficient power for a period of two years. Also the battery 
containers, protection structures and modularization of the battery should be given closer attention. 
These are however not considered in this report.   
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3.6  Signals and Communications 
 
Several subsea communication concepts were discussed in section 2.5. The wireless communication 
concepts introduce, in combination with local electric energy supply and the All-Electric control 
system, a fully autonomous subsea system. However, limitations in data capacity and unreliable 
signal transmissions restrict the application of subsea wireless communication technology for the 
Heimdal Subsea System.  
Fibre optic communication technology is considered the best alternative. Tampnet operates the 
largest offshore high capacity communication network in the world and more than 100 platforms, 
FPSO’s and exploration rigs utilize the integrated fiber network in the North Sea [73]. Tampnets 
integrated fiber optic network provides all the communication requirements for the Heimdal Subsea 
System. 
 
 
Figure 33: Integrated fibre optic network in the North Sea operated by Tampnet [73] 
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3.7 HIPPS 
 
The Vesterled pipeline system is a 32’’, 360km pipeline starting at Heimdal and ending at St. Fergus. 
It consists of two parts, where the first part has a design pressure of  164 barg and the second 148.9 
barg. Both the Oseberg and Draupner facilities can export gas with pressures beyond the design 
conditions of the Vesterled pipeline. Hence, the risks of over pressuring the Vesterled pipeline must 
be considered. A study carried out by Statoil on behalf of Gassco concluded that the Vesterled 
pipeline shall be protected by means of two independent safety systems [74]. These systems can be 
either of conventional  type (PSD and PSV), or unconventional (HIPPS) systems. The report evaluated 
the system as it is today and did not evaluate subsea solutions.  
The Vesterled pipeline needs to be protected by two independent safety systems. When the Heimdal 
facilities are removed, these systems can be located topside at the Oseberg and Draupner facilities, 
and/or at the Heimdal subsea manifold. It is further assumed that the Oseberg and Draupner 
facilities have conventional safety systems installed. These systems include Process shut down 
systems (PSD) and Pressure Safety Valves (PSV). The secondary safety system will be the 
instrumented (unconventional) Pressure Protection System (PPS), or High Integrity Pressure 
Protection System (HIPPS) which is discussed in section 2.9.  
The HIPPS system can be located at Oseberg and Draupner, or at the Heimdal subsea manifold. 
Subsea HIPPS introduces several additional challenges compared to topside solutions. However, a 
HIPPS system located at the subsea manifold, would only set requirements to one HIPPS compared 
to two for the topside alternative (at both Oseberg and Draupner). A subsea HIPPS is also beneficial 
with respect to future high pressure tie-ins to the system that could set requirements to an 
additional, third HIPPS to be installed.  
Safety instrumented secondary pressure protection systems, such as the HIPPS, shall be designed in 
accordance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 and OLF document GL 070 can be used as guidance for 
application of the standards [65]. IEC 61508 gives a risk based approach for deciding the Safety 
Integrity Level (SIL) required for Safety Instrumented Systems. Other projects, such as the Kristin field 
development [63] determined that a SIL 3 level was required for their HIPPS. It is further assumed 
that a SIL 3 rate is a reasonable requirement also for the Heimdal Subsea HIPPS. 
The function of the HIPPS is to safely isolate the downstream pipeline if the pressure exceeds the 
maximum allowable pressure. Initiators detect high pressures and closes one or two barrier valves 
(depending on the required safety level).  Basically there are two types of HIPPS [75]: The integral 
mechanical and the full electronic. The electronic version uses three pressure transmitters as 
initiators. The signals from the transmitters are interpreted by a logic solver, and initiate the 
shutdown sequence by de-energizing the solenoids if 2 out of 3  pressure transmitters exceeds the 
threshold pressure. The final element actuators will then be de-pressurized and the spring will close 
the barrier valve. See Figure 34 for overview. The final element actuator could also be electric. 
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Figure 34: Typical HIPPS safety loop (electrical initiators) [75] 
The HIPPS system with Integral mechanical initiators (Figure 35) relies on pressure control valves to 
initiate the shutdown sequence if the threshold pressure is met. No electronics are used. According 
to the author’s knowledge, no subsea projects have implemented this HIPPS technology, but for 
topside systems its functionality has been proven. For remote areas, a full stand-alone alternative is 
available. This system requires no external energy, but relies on pneumatic or hydraulic actuation 
utilizing the energy in the pipeline [76]. The redundant HIPPS system in Figure 35 obtains a SIL 4 rate.   
 
Figure 35: HIPPS system with integral mechanical initiators [75] 
To meet the requirements of the determined SIL rate, the HIPPS system requires periodic testing 
(proof testing) to verify the reliability of the system [77]. The testing frequency is related to the 
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD). See Table 2 in section 2.9 for the required PFD’s in relation to 
the SIL rates. Once a year (SIL 3) a full functional test is required. In addition comes valve leakage 
tests, sensor testing and response time testing. The required frequency of these tests must be 
specified for each project.  
The HIPPS system with electronic initiators is the only available on the subsea market as of today. 
Thus it will be the recommended concept for the Heimdal subsea system. However, Mokveld is 
currently in the patenting process of a new subsea HIPPS concept. They could not at the moment 
provide any information about the system due to the confidentiality involved in such processes. 
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3.8 Subsea pig launcher 
 
The Vesterled pipeline system must be designed suitable to pass pigs. Pigging operations are 
required for the pre-commissioning, commissioning and de-commissioning, in addition to periodic 
inspection and maintenance pigging operations. The Oseberg – Draupner pigging operations are 
conducted by launching the pig topside at the Oseberg facility and by retrieving it at the Draupner 
facility. Topside to topside pigging operations are not feasible for the Vesterled pipeline due to the 
decrease in diameter, bends and other obstructions in the manifold. Hence, a subsea pig launcher is 
required (See more in section 2.8). 
To meet the pigging requirements of the Vesterled pipeline, the manifold shall be designed with a 
guiding base arrangement into which a temporary pig launcher can mate. Opposed to the manifold 
piping, which minimum allowable diameter is 16’’, the tie-in to the Vesterled pipeline must be 32’’ to 
ensure its “pigability”. 
The mating of the subsea launcher and 
subsea arrangement is based on a 
horizontally oriented system (Figure 36). 
When a pigging operation campaign is to be 
conducted, an intervention vessel will use its 
guiding system to install the launcher on the 
subsea guiding base. The pig is pre-installed 
in the launcher. The main stream needs to 
be isolated prior to mating of the launcher 
and the pipeline. This is achieved by 
implementing a double block and bleed 
system which consists of two isolation valves 
in series, or a single integral double sealed 
valve with a bleed point in between [78].  
The integrity of the seal is verified by monitoring the 
pressure at the bleed connection in between the two seals. For this case, a system comprising two 
isolation valves in series and a bleed point in between is considered the best isolation concept. A 
single integral double block and bleed system is beneficial with respect to the manifolds weight. 
However, the increased reliability of two valves in series compared to one is emphasized. In 
situations where there are problems with the integrity of one seal, two seals provides redundancy. 
This can potentially save large costs when expensive intervention vessels are on the clock.  
A leak test is conducted at the bleed point by measuring the pressure. After the integrity of the seal 
is verified, the pressure cap is removed by opening the clamp with a ROV torque tool. The pig 
launcher is deployed with the vessel crane and lowered onto the guide base. It is further stroked into 
the hub and connected by closing the clamp with the ROV torque tool. The integrity of the 
connection is verified by injecting MEG from a hose deployed from the vessel. The isolation valves 
are opened by ROV actuation and the pig is pushed out of the launcher and into the flow line. This is 
achieved by pumping fluids (e.g. methanol or naphtha) into the launcher from a vessel deployed 
hose. The pig follows the gas flow and is retrieved at the St. Fergus gas terminal.  
Figure 36: Subsea pig launcher arrangement 
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3.9 Flow control module 
 
The flow control module incorporates  an electric actuated choke/control valve in addition to 
instrumentation such as pressure and temperature transmitters. The module is constructed 
retrievable, meaning that it can be retrieved separately from the manifold if maintenance is required.  
Various control valve designs exists on the market, but the use of high capacity subsea control valves 
is limited. The subsea axial control valve [79] delivered by Mokveld is considered a good alternative. 
 
Figure 37: Mokvelds Subsea Axial Control Valve [79] 
Mokveld has delivered a 8’’ electric  actuated anti-surge control valve to the subsea compressors on 
the Åsgard Subsea Compression Project. The manufacturer sees no limitations in implementing a 16’’ 
control valve into the Heimdal Subsea System [80].  
The subsea axial control valve has linear characteristics, fast and accurate control, high capacity and 
are designed for automatic operation with hydraulic or electric actuation.  
As 16’’ valves has not been requested by any operators before, the 16’’ subsea axial control valve 
must go through a qualification program before it can be implemented into the Heimdal Subsea 
System.  
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3.10 Subsea Concept Summarized 
 
This section summarizes the Heimdal Subsea manifold concept and its equipment. A 3D illustration 
(Figure 38)  has been prepared in Autodesk Inventor. The model is for illustration purposes only.  
 
Figure 38: 3D model of the Heimdal Subsea manifold 
A spool connects the OGT-DRP by-pass to the manifold. The spool is connected to the preinstalled 
tee connection on the by-pass at one end, and to the manifold on the other. The manifold 
components comprise a HIPPS module,  flow control module, four isolation valves and a pig-launcher 
guiding base. In addition it facilitates the tie-ins to the OGT-DRP pipeline and the Vesterled pipeline. 
The HIPPS and flow control modules can be retrieved separately if maintenance is required. The 
isolation valves provide the seals that are required for such operations. Two isolation valves are 
installed on the 32’’ piping to facilitate pigging operations. The Subsea Control Module (SCM) and 
Electric Power and Communication Distribution Unit (EPCDU) are not illustrated in the model, but 
will be installed as retrievable modules. 
The manifold structure will be protected from third party impact loads (such as dropped objects and 
trawling) by means of a protection structure. The protection structure has not been considered in 
this report.  
The battery package will be installed on a separate template close to the manifold template.  
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3.11 Weight Estimation 
 
It is desirable to minimize the weight and  size of the manifold since the costs of manufacturing and 
installation are very dependent of these factors. The installation costs represent a significant amount 
of the overall costs of a subsea manifold. The installation should therefore be continuously evaluated 
in the design process. This should include identification of installation vessels with adequate crane 
capacities, planning of marine operations and identification of risks associated with the installation. 
At this stage of the study it is difficult to accurately calculate the weight and dimensions of the 
manifold. A coarse estimate of the total weight and dimensions are however provided. The 
calculations and assumptions are given in Appendix F. The manifold dimensions are shown in Figure F 
1 and the total manifold weight is given in Table 5. 
Table 5: Weight estimates of manifold components (ref Appendix F) 
Component Weight [tons] 
Structures 138 
Flow control module 30 
HIPPS module 30 
32'' ball valve ×2 16 
16'' ball valve ×2 9 
Piping 7 
Total weight 230 
Protection Structure 40 
Battery package (excluding structures 
and additional components) 20 
 
Further studies needs to be initiated in cooperation with engineering companies and technology 
suppliers to achieve accurate values. These values will be the basis for the planning of marine 
operations and cost estimates.  
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4. Risk Assessment 
 
For the subsea concept discussed in this thesis to be justified, there are strong requirements to high 
availability of its functions and safe operations. To ensure these requirements, all risks associated 
with the design, installation and operation of the system must be identified. At this stage of the 
study, a review of the risks associated with the design and operation of the system will be 
performed.  
A risk assessment includes risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. The NORSOK standard 
Z-103 sets the following requirements for a risk assessment process [81]: 
a) Identify hazardous situations and potential accidental events 
b) Identify initiating events and describe their potential causes 
c) Analyze accidental sequences and their possible consequences 
d) Identify and assess risk reducing measures 
e) Provide a nuanced and overall picture of risk, presented in a way suitable for the various 
target groups/users and their specific needs and use 
The first step of the risk analysis process is to identify all relevant hazards. To carry out such 
identification processes several structured techniques such as FMECA, HAZOP/HAZID and SWIFT are 
used  by the industry. These techniques have in common that they are based on brainstorming 
sessions. At this stage of the study it is important to establish the overall risk picture. This can be 
done by conducting a Simplified Risk Analysis [82]. This technique identifies the most important risk 
contributors which can be further investigated by using more detailed analyses. In early studies it 
may be misguiding to use quantitative measures for risk description. Thus will a qualitative approach 
be given in this report. 
The risk analysis is conducted by dividing the subsea manifold into sub elements. These sub elements 
are: HIPPS, isolation valves, choke valve, subsea pig-launcher, tie-in points and manifold structure. 
Each sub element is evaluated by using a check list where undesirable events related to the sub 
element are identified. Further will the causes leading to the undesirable events be identified 
together with the consequence of the events. Since the Heimdal subsea manifold implements several 
unconventional technologies, it is challenging to assign probabilities. So to identify which risk 
contributors that are important to look further into, the risk picture will be presented in a qualitative 
risk matrix. See Table D 1  (Appendix D) for consequence categories. The uncertainties regarding the 
occurrence of the undesirable events  are considered by the categories in Table D 2. 
To identify relevant risks, a brainstorming session was arranged. The participants represented 
experience within subsea systems, marine operations, platforms and pipelines. The further risk 
analyses should also include representatives from the technology suppliers. To set focus on the most 
important risk contributors, the top 11 risks associated with the subsea system were identified. The 
check list that was used during the session is presented in Table D 3. The risks (or undesirable events) 
were evaluated in terms of causes, consequences and the probability/uncertainty of occurrence. The 
evaluation of the risks are presented in the risk matrix (Table 6). 
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Table 6: The top 11 identified risks presented in a risk matrix (see Table D 3 for references) 
  
Probability  
Consequence Minor Unlikely Likely Frequent 
Extensive 
        
Severe 
Dropped objects  
(10) 
 
HIPPS fails to isolate 
(1) 
 
Hydrate formation 
due to cool-down 
effects (5) 
Damage of subsea 
structures due to 
third party marine 
activity(11) 
    
Moderate 
Hydrate formation 
due to HIPPS 
functional tests(2) 
 
Gas leakage in tie-in 
points(9) 
Isolation valves fails 
to open/close(3) 
 
Pig-launcher mating 
problems(7) 
 
Integrity of seals are 
not verified(8) 
Inaccurate choke 
regulation(4) 
 
Problems with 
module retrievals (6) 
  
Minor 
  
    
  
 
The red region in the risk matrix is categorized as unacceptable risks. If the risks are in the red region 
after mitigating measures have been taken, the project cannot continue. The risks in the yellow 
region are acceptable after cost efficient measures have been implemented and the project finds the 
risks to be satisfactory. The risks in the green region are considered acceptable risks. They should 
however be subject to the” As Low As Reasonable Practicable” (ALARP) principle.  
Seen from the risk matrix, no risks are categorized as unacceptable. But the yellow region high lights 
risks that require risk reducing measures and/or further analyses before they can be deemed 
satisfactory. In Table 7 are recommended risk reducing measures presented. 
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Table 7: Risk reducing measures to reduce the risks to acceptable levels 
Risks Risk reducing measures 
Dropped objects (10) -Protection structures 
-Mechanical analyses 
HIPPS fails to isolate (1) -Further analyses in cooperation with technology 
suppliers.  
-The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) gives the 
requirements for the reliability of such systems   
-Quantitative analyses must be conducted 
Hydrate formation due to cool-down effects (5) -This risk must be further analyzed (see section 
4.1) 
Damage of subsea structures due to third party 
marine activity (11) 
-Protections structures 
-Statistical analyses of marine activity 
-Mechanical analyses of impact scenarios 
-Trenching 
Inaccurate choke regulation (4) -Further analyses in cooperation with technology 
suppliers 
-Analyses of interface with control system 
-RAM analyses 
Problems with module retrievals (6) -Further analyses with technology suppliers and 
IMR contractors 
 
 
This simplified (or coarse) risk assessment identified several risks that need further analyses before 
they can be deemed satisfactory. They should be given close attention in the further development of 
the Heimdal Subsea System. In the next section, the risk of hydrate formation due to cool-down 
effects is further analyzed.  
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4.1 Hydrates 
 
One substantial consideration for gas transportation networks is the risk of hydrate formations in the 
pipelines. Hydrates have the potential to reduce the capacity of the pipeline and in the worst case to 
plug it. With the presence of liquid water in the gas flow, hydrates are formed under low 
temperature and high pressure conditions. (see Figure 39). 
 
Figure 39: Hydrates forming conditions for 0.7 gravity natural gas [83] 
Natural gas often contains solved water vapour which has the potential to dissolve and accumulate 
as liquids in the pipeline. To avoid the risk of hydrate formations, the gas requires sufficient 
dehydration before entering the transportation network.  
The Heimdal subsea manifold could be vulnerable to hydrate formations due to significant choking of 
the gas flow across the choke valve (which in some operational scenarios could be required). See 
more about choke valves in section 2.6. The pressure loss will be followed by a decrease in 
temperature (the Joule-Thomson effect), and the conditions for hydrate formations could be present. 
Also the yearly functional test of the HIPPS barrier valves could introduce problems with hydrate 
formations. When the valves are closed, depending on the time before they are re-opened, the gas 
will cool down to ambient sea water temperature. However, the Heimdal subsea manifold is located 
so far away from the Oseberg and Draupner facilities that the gas flow temperature will be equal to 
ambient temperature anyways. Hence, functional testing of the HIPPS valves shouldn’t introduce any 
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additional challenges with respect to hydrate formations. Significant choking scenarios should 
however be investigated.  
The export gas compressors at the Oseberg facility have the capacity to deliver gas at 170 bar with 
typical 50° Celsius. At the Heimdal subsea manifold (which is located approximately 110 km away 
from the Oseberg facility), the temperature will be close to the ambient seawater temperature which 
ranges from 4-10°  Celsius. There will not be a significant frictional pressure loss over this distance. 
See Appendix C Figure C 2 for temperature and pressure profiles. To calculate the expected 
temperature loss across the choke valve, an extreme case will be evaluated. The design pressure in 
OGT-DRP is 40 bar larger than Vesterled, which in few cases could be the required differential 
pressure across the choke valve. This will be the base case for the calculations. 
The relationship between pressure loss and decrease in temperatures is given by the Joule-Thomson 
coefficient [83]: 
 
 
Where: 
CP = Specific heat capacity of gas [J/kgK] 
R = Gas constant [J/kgK] 
Tm = Average temperature [K] 
Pm = Average pressure [Pa] 
Z = Compressibility factor 
T = Temperature [K] 
P = Pressure [Pa] 
 
See Appendix C for calculations. 
 
The calculations shows that the differential temperature across the choke valve is 7-8 °C under the 
given conditions. This results in a temperature T2 = -4 °C downstream the valve (when the ambient 
seawater temperature is 4° C). Due to inaccuracies  in calculations and the fact that the calculations 
are based on a theoretical model, the uncertainties in calculations should be considered. Typical cool 
down values for Joule-Thomson expansion is 0.25-0.4 °C/bar [84] , which in this case is between 10 
and 16°C. Comparing to the theoretical model, the inaccuracies range from 20 to 50%. For safety 
reasons, the 16° C differential temperature is considered for the further evaluations. This results in a 
temperature T2 of -14° C when the ambient seawater temperature is 4° C.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
    
    
  
  
  
  
   ≈ 
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A Pressure, Volume and Temperature (PVT)  simulation was conducted to evaluate the risk of 
deposition of liquid water in the gas flow due to a temperature decrease across the choke valve. The 
Gas Chromatograph (GC) at the Oseberg facility shows typical water containment in the range 1-
5ppm. For safety reasons, a simulation of the hydrocarbon (yellow) and water (blue) phase envelopes 
with a 20ppm water containment was conducted (Figure 40). 
 
Figure 40: Phase envelopes of the Oseberg gas with 20ppm water containment.  The blue curve indicates the phase of 
water and  the yellow curve, the phase of hydrocarbons. In the regions to the left of the curves there will be liquid 
deposition. 
 It is observed from Figure 40 that there will be no depositions of liquid water under the given 
conditions. 
 
 A second analysis was conducted to investigate the critical water containment which could result in 
liquid water deposition (Figure 41). The results show that with a water containment of 35ppm and -
14°C, there is a risk of liquid deposition in the manifold which could result in hydrate formation.  
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Figure 41: Phase envelopes with 35ppm water containment. With a temperature of -14°C and 35ppm water containment, 
there is a risk of liquid water deposition. 
The analyses shows that with a ΔP = 40bar over the choke valve and a water containment of 35ppm, 
there could be depositions of liquid water  which could result in hydrate formation in the manifold. 
 A water containment of 35ppm is not considered realistic since this is a deviation of the terms and 
conditions for entering the Gassco operated gas transportation system [85]. In addition, is a ΔP = 
40bar across the choke valve normally not required. Hence is the risk of hydrate formation in the 
Heimdal subsea manifold minimal. It is however recommended that different operational scenarios 
are investigated and that the risk of off-spec gas entering the system is evaluated. 
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5. Alternative Concepts 
 
The advances of subsea technology the past decades have been significant and the future  offshore 
O&G production facilities are moving from the topside to the seabed. When O&G developments 
move towards increasingly harsher environments and deeper waters, subsea developments may be 
the only feasible alternative. However,  it is important to evaluate other concepts as well.  
5.1 Conventional Topside Alternative  
 
When Heimdal processing is shut down, the decommissioning process of Heimdal Main Platform 
(HMP) initiates. Today, all utility systems that are required to operate the Heimdal Riser Platform 
(HRP) are provided by HMP. Hence, the functions performed by HMP must be replaced. A study 
carried out by Gassco evaluated different concepts to maintain the functions of HRP [86]. A new 
living quarter/utility jacket with associated safety systems in addition to a flare jacket platform was 
the recommended solution (Figure 42). Modifications on HRP will also be required. 
 
Figure 42: New topside concept to maintain the functions of Heimdal Riser Platform 
The new platform concept is considered technical feasible. However, significant investments are 
required. The total CAPEX is estimated to 5000-6000 MNOK. Also considering the OPEX of a 
standalone gas transition hub with utilities and personnel, the costs could be difficult to justify. 
In the next section an alternative topside concept will be briefly evaluated. 
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5.2  Unmanned Platforms 
 
Operators are constantly focusing on optimization and cost reduction to maximize the profits of their 
offshore projects. As an alternative to subsea developments, Statoil recently announced that they 
were studying  a concept which is a competing alternative to subsea developments: “Subsea on slim 
legs” [87]. “Subsea on slim legs” represents a relatively small and unmanned platform without 
helideck and living quarters (Figure 43). This concept could be a cost effective alternative to subsea 
satellite well developments in shallow waters. 
 
Figure 43: «Subsea on slim legs» concept [87] 
Unmanned platforms are not a new concept. Unmanned satellite platforms were first introduced in 
1979 and have been used in many developments the later years. In the South China Sea, unmanned 
satellite platforms were successfully implemented in the  1980’s [88]. These platforms were installed 
on  four legged jacket structures with two modules(utility and well module), helideck and a crane. 
Regular maintenance was required (up to five times a week), thereby challenging the claim that the 
facilities were unmanned. In 1990 the first Slim Tripod Adapted to Rig (STAR) satellite platform was 
installed in the Danish sector of the North Sea [89]. The STAR platform concept was developed to 
meet the requirements of a small and simple platform type for shallow waters (Figure 44).  
 
Figure 44: Tyra Southeast extension in the North Sea (Danish sector) [90] and  STAR platform Concept (type B topside) 
[89] 
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The topsides installations can be put to a minimum (type A) or with extended installations (type B). 
The difference between type A and B is that type B also have a helideck installation, a 20 tons crane,  
a test separator and emergency accommodation for 9 men. All access to the type A platform is 
facilitated by vessels. 
The unmanned satellite platforms were developed to reduce the costs of developing marginal fields 
as an alternative to subsea satellite wells. The costs are saved by a combination of smart design and 
minimal staffing. This concept, whether it is a STAR or a conventional jacket design, should also be 
feasible to maintain the functions of the Heimdal gas transition hub.  
When Heimdal Processing is shut down, the decommissioning process of HMP initiates. The topside 
structure on HRP could be removed, leaving the jacket structure as the fundament for the unmanned 
platform topsides. The unmanned topside installation could comprise a utility module, the manifold, 
safety systems and control systems. The power supply could be provided by a diesel generator or an 
electric cable from shore. 
For this concept to be feasible, a maintenance strategy which minimizes the required presence of 
personnel at the facility is required. This is probably one of the main challenges with this concept. 
Without a helideck, the maintenance personnel would be required to access the platform by a vessel. 
This could be challenging due to the vessels motions. Hence, are the weather conditions a factor. The 
fact that the vessel is very close to the platform when the crew is boarding, would probably set strict 
operational criteria. The risks of vessel-platform impact and personnel injuries would be a major 
concern. Maintenance is often an all-year requirement, also at winter time when the weather 
windows for such marine operations may be small and few. The risk of “waiting on weather” could 
prove to be an expensive truth. Without living quarters, a vessel would be required to be present at 
all times during the maintenance campaigns. With limited operational window and high vessel day 
rates, the costs of such operations could be significant. Choosing an efficient maintenance strategy 
and at the same time maintain high integrity of the platform could prove to be very challenging.  
Challenges related to regularity and potential unplanned shutdowns of unmanned platforms are 
major concerns for riser platforms where high availability is required. 
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6. Qualification of new technology 
 
The functional requirements of the Heimdal Subsea System are fundamentally different from other 
subsea developments due to the fact that no O&G production is involved. The technologies that have 
been assessed in this report have evolved from R&D projects with the objectives of improving subsea 
production systems. The application of these technologies have however, been very limited. The 
reason for this could be the increasing complexity of such systems. The subsea concept presented in 
this report is much “simpler” than subsea production systems. And this may be the reason why 
technologies that earlier have been screened by operators, in this system can find their application. 
Some of the technologies that have been assessed in this report are considered unconventional 
technologies. They are not new technologies, but they lack the field experience of their conventional 
alternatives. Implementation of such technologies introduces uncertainties that imply risks for the 
operator. And before this technology can be applied, a comprehensive qualification program is 
required. DNV’s recommended practices gives a systematic approach on how to manage the risks 
associated with the implementation of new (and unconventional) technology [91]. The qualification 
program (Figure 45) shall be an iterative process with a strategy that shows how the technology shall 
be taken from its existing stage of development to its goal.  
 
Figure 45: The technology qualification program iterating through three stages [91] 
 The qualification program consists of three stages: the concept evaluation, pre-engineering and 
detailed engineering stages. At each stage, milestones should be established to guide the program. 
Before entering a new stage, decision gates should be linked to the verification of these milestones. 
To meet the requirements and milestones of the qualification program, a systematic approach is 
given by the Qualification Process (Figure 46). 
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Figure 46: The qualification process. M* = milestone [91] 
If there are, through the process discovered changes in boundary conditions, reliability, safety, etc. 
that requires modifications, this will trigger full or partial iterations of the process for the basis to be 
satisfied. The steps of the qualification process are given below: 
 The technology basis shall specify the technology and answer questions such as; how the 
technology will be used,  what is the environment,  what are its required functions, how shall 
it perform and what is the acceptance criteria. It shall also specify the milestones it needs to 
meet in order to be qualified.  
 The technology assessment determines which elements that introduce new technology and 
what their challenges and uncertainties are. For complex systems it is recommended that the 
main challenges and uncertainties are identified by conducting a HAZID (Hazard 
Identification).  
 The threat assessment shall identify all failure modes and the risks associated with these. To 
guide the process, methods such as FMECA, FTA and HAZOP may be used. In the early 
technology development, qualitative methods can be used, but as the program develops 
quantitative measures should be given. The identified failure modes and risks should be 
categorized in a risk matrix so that the risks can be prioritized in the qualification plan. 
 When the basis is set and the uncertainties and challenges are identified, a qualification plan 
must be set in order to determine the activities and methods that are required to provide the 
evidence which shall comply with the requirements of  the technology basis. Such activities 
comprises engineering analyses, numerical analyses such as e.g. CFD and FEM, 
experimenting, investigating earlier studies,  looking into standards and so on.  
 Further comes the execution of the qualification plan. This step includes carrying out all the 
planned qualification activities, collecting and documenting data and determining the 
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performance margin of each failure mode. The product of this step is well documented 
evidence that complies with the qualification basis. 
 The performance assessment reviews the evidence acquired from the qualification activities 
against the technology qualification basis. This includes confirmation that all the 
requirements are met and the risk and uncertainty are reduced to an acceptable level. The 
performance assessment is concluded by decision makers whether or not a specific 
qualification stage in the program has been reached. If the evidence doesn’t comply with the 
design basis, modifications are required  (See Figure 46) or the technology is screened.  
The iterative process in the qualification program gives a well-defined; risk based and well 
documented approach on how to qualify technology.  
The industry uses a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) as a measure of a technology’s development 
state. This scale varies from unproven ideas (TRL 0) to proven technology (TRL 7).  Various scales are 
in use by the industry today. A technology readiness ranking from the API standard [92] is given in 
Figure 47. TRL 7 is considered proven technology and TRL 0-6 shall be qualified according to a 
qualification program (E.g. as given by DNV-RP-A203). 
 
Figure 47: Technology readiness ranking [92] 
Since acceptance criteria are ambiguous and vary in the industry it is difficult to determine when a 
TRL has been reached. To guide this process, acceptance criteria should be assigned to each TRL. 
These acceptance criteria shall be verified by evidence which is acquired through the qualification 
process. The TRL ranking in Figure 47 is given in API 17N, Recommended Practice for Subsea 
Production System Reliability and Technical Risk Management. This ranking system will be used to 
assess the readiness of some of the technologies discussed in this report. First a coarse assessment of 
each technology component in the subsea manifold is given. This is done to focus the work on the 
technologies that requires the most comprehensive qualification programme. The assessment is 
subjective and is based on knowledge achieved by the author through the work of this thesis.  
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Subsea manifold 
Subsea  production manifolds have been widely used in the O&G industry the last decades. A gas 
transition hub manifold presents a simpler concept than production manifolds and there is no reason 
to believe that there are any limitations in the design of such systems. The BP Bombax gas pipeline 
project (section 2.2) is the best reference to similar projects.  
All-Electric control system 
The All-Electric control system is an advancing technology. The system has not been widely used 
subsea, but several R&D  projects within this field have commenced the later years. This technology 
is critical for the concept discussed in this report to be feasible, since the alternative would introduce 
the implementation of hydraulic control systems. Further studies, in cooperation with 
manufacturers, have to be initiated for this technology to be qualified for the Heimdal Subsea 
System. 
Lithium-Ion battery package (remote energy supply) 
The concept proved its feasibility in the SWACS project in 1987 (ref section 2.3.3), but the project 
replaced the system with a sea-water battery due to its dependence of periodical recharging by 
interventions vessels. Since 1987 much work has been done within lithium-Ion technology and it is 
reasonable to believe that the maturity and feasibility of such systems are much greater today. This is 
also a key technology in the development of autonomous vehicles such as the AUV’s. This technology 
may not be feasible for subsea productions systems due to the high power demands. Until now, 
manufacturers may have lacked the drivers to develop high capacity rechargeable subsea lithium-ion 
batteries. In combination with the All-Electric control system, this is a key technology that requires 
comprehensive studies before its functionality can be verified. 
Subsea isolation valves 
Without further references, it is concluded that subsea isolation valves are well qualified technology 
in the industry.  
Subsea Control/choke valves 
Subsea control/choke valves have been widely used by the industry. The use of high capacity subsea 
control valves have, however, been limited. Their compatibility with electric actuators does require 
further studies. 
HIPPS 
A subsea HIPPS system is considered an unconventional pressure protection technology, although it 
has been applied by several subsea projects. Its compatibility with  the All-Electric control system will 
require qualification. The HIPPS system that relies on mechanical initiators would however, eliminate 
the dependence of a control system. This system do not currently exists for subsea systems and 
studies should be initiated to investigate its feasibility. 
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Subsea Pig-launching 
Subsea pig-launching is considered a proven technology 
Installation and Tie-ins 
Without further reference, installation of the by-pass, manifold and the tie-in operations are 
considered well known operations. 
Summary 
 The course assessment high lightens the Lithium-Ion rechargeable battery, All-Electric control 
system and HIPPS system as immature technologies. In Appendix E an evaluation of these 
technologies are given. In Table 8 are the assigned TRL’s given. Note that these are based on a 
subjective evaluation by the author and that further studies are required to verify these levels. 
Table 8: Technology Readiness Level of immature technologies according to API 17N 
Technology Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
All-Electric Control System TRL 4 
Rechargeable Lithium-Ion Battery Package TRL 3 
Subsea HIPPS TRL 4 
 
To reach higher levels of technology readiness, a comprehensive qualification process is required 
(Figure 46). Such processes require a consistent basis which defines the required functions and the 
activities that can provide the evidence for decision makers to conclude that the milestones have 
been reached. A simplified strategy for reaching a higher technology readiness level is given in    
Table 9. 
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Table 9: Qualification strategy 
Technology Functions Performance Qualification 
Activities 
Milestones 
 
All-Electric 
Control System 
 
-The interface between 
subsea system and 
master controls station 
- Electric actuators for 
operation of 
choke/control valve 
-Signal transmissions 
 
Continuous 
operation. 
Availability ≈ 
100 %  
 
-Carry out risk 
analyses such as 
FMECA, 
HAZID/HAZOP and 
FTA to identify 
failure modes and 
risks 
-Verify 
compatibility 
between the 
electric actuator 
and the 16’’ choke 
valve 
-Contact relevant 
manufactures 
- Investigate the 
power 
consumption 
 
 
-Electric actuator 
is compatible with 
the choke valve 
-The Lithium Ion 
Battery package 
can provide the 
required energy 
for the control 
system 
- Fiber network 
can provide the 
required data 
capacity  
- The identified 
risks must be 
managed 
 
Lithium-Ion 
Battery 
 
-Provides electric energy 
for operation of the 
control system 
 
Continuous 
operation. 
Availability ≈ 
100 % 
 
-Carry out risk 
analyses such as 
FMECA, 
HAZID/HAZOP and 
FTA to identify 
failure modes and 
risks 
-Verify the 
compatibility 
between the 
control system 
and battery 
- Do analyses of 
the required 
battery capacity 
-investigate 
requirements for 
power 
substitution  
- Investigate 
requirements for 
intervention 
vessels and 
marine operations 
 
 
 
 
-The Battery is 
compatible with 
electric control 
system 
-A strategy for 
energy 
substitution by 
intervention vessel  
- The battery can 
provide the 
required energy in 
its operation 
interval  
- The identified 
risks must be 
managed 
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HIPPS 
 
Isolates the lower 
pressure rated pipeline if 
maximum allowed 
pressure is exceeded 
 
Continuous 
operation. 
Availability ≈ 
100 % 
 
-Carry out risk 
analyses such as 
FMECA, 
HAZID/HAZOP and 
FTA to identify 
failure modes and 
risks 
-Verify the 
compatibility 
between electric 
actuators and 
barrier valves 
- Investigate the 
possibilities to 
implement 
mechanical 
initiators 
-Investigate 
requirements to 
functional testing 
 
 
-The barrier valves 
are compatible 
with electric 
actuators 
- A testing strategy 
to achieve the 
required SIL rate 
- The identified 
risks must be 
managed 
 
In this section a simplified method on how to approach a qualification processes is given. 
Qualification of new technology is a time consuming process which requires a significant proportion 
of resources. The process should involve representatives from the technology suppliers and the 
operator of the system. All functions must be well-defined and unambiguous. To guide the process, 
milestones must be established to ensure that all participants work towards the same goal. The most 
time consuming part of the process is the activities that are required to provide the evidence which  
verifies if the milestones are met. If the evidence comply with the milestones and the risks associated 
with the technology are reduced to a satisfying level, a new level of qualification is reached. This will 
be the process from the concept evaluation phase, through the pre-engineering phase and at last the 
detailed engineering phase. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Recent advances in subsea technology enables functions that earlier were performed by platforms to 
be converted into subsea systems. Subsea developments permits offshore production in areas where 
conventional platform designs are economical or technical unfeasible. They also offer reduced CAPEX 
and OPEX  in addition to risk reduction in terms of HSE. This makes subsea developments attractive 
alternatives to conventional topside developments. 
Traditionally in the O&G industry, subsea developments have involved production and processing. 
Until now, the requirements of a mid/down-stream operator such as Gassco have not been widely 
evaluated.  Operators are continuously focusing on optimizing functions to reduce the costs and risks 
associated with their subsea projects. As a result of this, many R&D projects within subsea 
technology have commenced the later years. The applications (and further development) of some of 
these technologies have been limited. However, the requirements of a subsea gas transition hub 
enables technologies that earlier have been screened out by operators  to be applied  in the Heimdal 
Subsea System. 
The functions that are required to obtain high system availability and regularity  in addition to safe 
operations, are incorporated within a 230 tons subsea manifold (excluding protection structure). The 
manifold components comprises a HIPPS module, flow control module, 4 isolation valves and a pig 
launcher guiding base (Figure 48). A lithium-ion battery package will be installed on a separate 
template close to the manifold template for the power supply. The battery will be recharged 
periodically by an intervention vessel. 
 
Figure 48: Heimdal Subsea System 
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A 16’’ spool connected to a pre-installed tee on the 36’’ bypass spool ties the manifold to the OGT-
DRP system. The tie-in to the Vesterled pipeline must be 32’’ to ensure its “pigability” with a subsea 
pig launcher.  
The All-Electric control system will be implemented for control and operation of the system 
functions. Compared to conventional control systems, the All-Electric technology eliminates 
problems and challenges related to hydraulics. In combination with a rechargeable Lithium-Ion 
battery package, this concept eliminates the requirement of a long and costly umbilical.  Reliable and 
high capacity communication is established through the Tampnet operated subsea fibre network. 
The requirements of this system is fundamentally different from other subsea developments due to 
the fact that no production is involved. This thesis evaluates the opportunities and challenges related 
to subsea technology relevant for a subsea gas transition hub. Several of these technologies are 
considered unconventional and a technology qualification program  is required before they can be 
implemented into the Heimdal Subsea System. This does not mean that the concept is unfeasible, 
but a combination of technology uncertainties and a conservative industry may have limited the 
applications of such systems. 
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8. Recommendations for Further Work 
 
This report have assessed opportunities and challenges related to a subsea gas transition hub. The 
focus has been on unconventional technologies that have not been widely used by the industry. If 
the concept shall reach  satisfying levels of qualification, further studies have to be initiated. This 
section gives recommendations for studies and assessments that should be given proper attention in 
the process towards a full functional subsea gas transition hub. See section 6 for more details.  
Marine Operations 
The installation costs represents a significant amount of the overall costs of a subsea manifold, the 
installation should therefore be continuously evaluated in the design process.  
IMR 
A subsea system requires periodic inspection and maintenance. An Inspection, Maintenance and 
Repair (IMR) strategy should be developed. 
The strategy for the recharging of the battery package must be developed. 
All-Electric Control System 
The All-Electric control system is critical for the feasibility of the concept presented in this report. All-
Electric subsea control systems have not been widely used by the industry and further studies in 
cooperation with technology suppliers should be initiated.  
Lithium-Ion subsea battery 
The high capacity subsea Lithium-Ion battery is a new concept that requires qualification work before 
it can be implemented into the Heimdal Subsea System. Section 3.5.2 presents calculations for the 
capacity requirements of the battery. These calculations are however simplified and should be given 
further attention.  
Alternative energy sources 
The conventional electric cable concept for the power supply was early screened out by the author of 
this report. This was due to the costs and risks that were assumed to be of such magnitude that it 
could not be justified. This is however an alternative that should be further investigated as it 
eliminates the risks that are accompanied with the implementation of new technology (Subsea high 
capacity batteries). 
The local energy sources discussed in section 2.4 and 3.5 should also be further investigated.  
Weight estimates 
Section 3.11 give a simplified weight estimate. As the weight of the manifold is critical with respect to 
costs, more accurate estimates should be provided.  
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HIPPS technology 
The compatibility between  the  subsea HIPPS and the All-Electric control system must be verified. 
Also the feasibility of subsea HIPPS based on mechanical initiators should be investigated.  
Cost estimates 
The potential of reducing costs compared to alternative solutions must be proven. This will include 
cost estimation in terms of both CAPEX and OPEX. 
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Appendix A 
 
Density, velocity, pressure, temperature and flow rate data retrieved from SCADA. 
 
Figure A 1: SCADA measurements at Heimdal reporting point (Oseberg-Heimdal Riser), december 2013. 
 
 
Figure A 2: SCADA measurements at Heimdal reporting point (Oseberg-Heimdal Riser), december 2013. Average, 
minimum and maximum values. 
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Figure A 3: SCADA measurements at Heimdal reporting point (Oseberg-Heimdal Riser). Measured pressure when the 
velocity peak (V=3.625 m/s) 
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Appendix B 
 
Calculations of the required battery capacity.  
  
Assumptions: 
 
Table B 1: Battery capacity sizing assumptions 
1 Typical roll screw diameters ranges from about 0.14 to 5.91 inches. It is assumed that the 
diameter of the stem is close to the diameter of the screw. For these calculations, the 
diameter of the stem is set to d = 1,57’’ (40mm) [69] 
2 The materials are not specified. The friction factor µ is assumed to be 0,20. Steel vs Steel 
friction factor with lubricated surfaces is 0,16. [93] 
3 Frictional losses in the gears, screws and other mechanical losses is not considered in detail. 
They are however considered by implementing an uncertainty factor which is set to 1.2. 
4 The motor speed is assumed to be 500 rpm 
5 The time it takes to manoeuvre the valve position is 15s.  
6 The valve will be actuated 5 times a day (average) 
7 The Motor efficiency is 0,9 
8 An inner pressure of Pi = 150 bar is used in the calculations. The design pressure of Vesterled 
is 149 bar. 
9 The period in-between service/recharging of the battery package is two years (730 days) 
 
10 The energy density in lithium-ion batteries is 200 Wh/kg [71] 
11 Self-Discharge rate of lithium-ion batteries is 3 % per month (1.5 % is given in [70]). This is 
considered a conservative assumption, so safety is included.   
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The following calculations consider a 10 bar pressure differential across the valve. Other pressure 
differentials are presented in the tables below. Note that the calculations of the required force to 
operate the valve is simplified, and that an uncertainty factor of 1.2 is included.  
 
Table B 2: Calculations of the force which is required to manoeuvre the valve position. An uncertainty factor of 1.2 is 
included to account for simplifications and assumptions. 
 
 
Table B 3: Calculations of the required motor torque 
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Table B 4: The actuator power consumption over two years (given the assumptions of actuation frequencies and 
manoeuvring time). 
 
 
Table B 5: The continuous power consumed by signal transmissions, sensors, etc. (over two years) 
 
Total power consumption and the corresponding required battery mass: 
Table B 6: The mass of a lithium-ion battery which can provide the required energy throughout two years (assuming 200 
Wh/kg) 
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Table B 7: The table shows the relation between the differential pressure across the valve and the required battery mass. 
(a continuous consumption of 100W is assumed) 
 
The self-discharge rate of 3% per month must be considered. In Table B 8 is the power consumption 
of the subsea system compared to the required battery capacity due to self-discharge presented: 
Table B 8: Considering the self-discharging secondary batteries experience, the table shows that the battery must be 
designed with larger capacity due to this phenomena.  
 
 
A factor of 2700/1900 = 1,42 ≈ 1,4 must be multiplied with the required power consumption to 
account for the battery self-discharge rate of 3% per month.  
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Table B 9 demonstrates the dependencies between continuous power consumption and the required 
battery mass. A pressure differential across the valve of 10 bar is assumed for these calculations.  The 
numbers shows that the continuous consumption is the most critical factor with respect to the 
required battery capacity. 
Table B 9: These number demonstrates the dependencies between the continuous power consumption and the 
corresponding required battery mass. It can be observed that the continuous power consumption is critical with respect 
to the required battery capacity. 
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Appendix C 
 
Joule – Thomson Effect 
Expanding gases will experience a decrease in temperature. The relation between pressure loss and 
decrease in temperature is given by the Joule – Thomson Coefficient [reference]: 
 
 
Where: 
CP = Specific heat capacity of gas [J/KgK] 
R = Gas constant [J/kgK] 
Tm = Average temperature [K] 
Pm = Average pressure [Pa] 
Z = Compressibility 
T = Temperature [K] 
 
The Gas composition and properties is given in Table C 1.  
 
 
Table C 1: Gas composition and calculations of properties 
Component yi M 
Mm [kg/kmol 
gas] Tcr [K] yi × Tcr [K] 
Pcr 
[Mpa] 
yi × Pcr 
[Mpa] 
C1 0,87557 16,04 14,044 196,700 172,225 4,641 4,064 
C2 0,07514 30,07 2,259 305,400 22,948 4,883 0,367 
C3 0,02077 44,09 0,916 370,000 7,685 4,257 0,088 
i-C4 0,0013 58,12 0,076 408,200 0,531 3,648 0,005 
n-C4 0,00168 58,12 0,098 525,200 0,882 3,797 0,006 
i-C5 0,00013 72,5 0,009 461,000 0,060 3,330 0,000 
n-C5 0,0001 72,5 0,007 469,800 0,047 3,375 0,000 
C6 0,00001 84 0,001 503,000 0,005 2,976 0,000 
C7 0,00175 96 0,168 542,100 0,949 3,014 0,005 
N2 0,00832 28,02 0,233 126,000 1,048 3,392 0,028 
CO2 0,01542 44,01 0,679 304,300 4,692 7,398 0,114 
H2S 0,01 34,08 0,341 1210,300 12,103 9,005 0,090 
SUM 1,00   18,83   223,17   4,77 
 
Case Data: 
 Valve inlet pressure P1: 190 bar (design pressure OGT-DRP) 
 Valve outlet pressure P2: 150 bar ( ≈ Vesterled design pressure) 
 Inlet temperature T1: 10°Celcius = 283K 
 CP = 3250 J/kgK (assumed value) 
 ΔP = 40 bar 
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 Pm (mean value) = 170 bar 
 ΔT = 16K (assuming decrease in temperature 1°C  per 2.5bar pressure loss) 
 Tm = 275 K 
 
Pseudo reduced temperature Tr: Temperature* / T’cr 
 Temperature = Tm ± 10 K (assuming that the temperature will vary with 10K around 
mean temperature) 
 T’cr = 223.17 
 Tr = 1.28 and 1.19 
Pseudo reduced pressure Pr: Pm / P’Cr 
 P’cr = 47.7 bar 
 Pr = 3,57 
 
From Figure C 1: Z = 0,62 and 0,57 
 
Figure C 1: Compressibility factor for real gases [83] 
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From Table C 1: 
 Mm = 18.83 kg/kmol 
 Relative molecular weight G = 18.83/29 = 0.65  
 R = 8.314 / 18.83 = 441.5 J/KgK 
- The weight G is relative to the weight of air: Mair= 29 kg/kmol 
- 8.314 is the universal gas constant 
The Joule Thomson Constant µ: 
 
 
 
µ = 0.000307 × 1.964 × 0.003 = 1.8074×10^-6 
 
 
 
ΔT = 1.506 × 10^-6 × 40 = 7.2°C  
T2 = 2.8°C 
 
In  Table C 2 the differential pressure across the valve is calculated as a function of valve inlet 
temperature 
 
Table C 2: Differential temperature across the choke valve as functions of inlet temperature T1 
T1 Z ΔT T2 
10 
Z1 0.62 
7.2 
2.8 
Z2 0.56 
9 
Z1 0.61 
7.2 1.8 
Z2 0.55 
8 
Z1 0.61 
7.2 0.8 
Z2 0.55 
7 
Z1 0.62 
7.7 
-0.7 
Z2 0.555 
6 
Z1 0.62 
7.6 
-1.6 
Z2 0.555 
5 
Z1 0.61 
7.6 
-2.6 
Z2 0.545 
4 
Z1 0.61 
8.1 
-4.1 
Z2 0.545 
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Figure C 2: Typical temperature and pressure profile at the Oseberg-Heimdal pipeline. Data collected from SCADA 
1.12.2013. 
 
PVT.SIM – Phase envelopes 
PVT SIM is a  PVT (Pressure Volume Temperature) simulation  program developed for reservoir 
engineers, flow assurance specialists, PVT lab engineers and process engineers. The programme 
combines fluid characteristics with complex algorithms to simulate fluids behaviour. In this case, a 
simulation of a typical Oseberg gas composition  (Table C 1) is conducted.  
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Appendix D 
 
Table D 1: Consequence categories [94] 
Consequence 
Category Personnel Environment Assets Reputation 
Extensive Fatalities 
Global or national 
effect 
Project costs > USD 
10 mill 
International 
impact/neg. 
Exposure 
Severe Major injury 
Restoration time > 
1 yr. Restoration 
cost > USD 1 mill. 
Project costs > USD 
1 mill 
Extensive national 
impact 
Moderate Minor injury 
Restoration time > 
1 md. Restoration 
cost > USD 1 K. 
Project costs > USD 
100 k 
Limited National 
impact 
Minor 
Illness or slight 
injury 
Restoration time < 
1md. Resoration 
cost < USD 1K 
Project costs < USD 
1 K 
Local impact 
 
Table D 2: Probability categories [94] 
Probability 
Minor Unlikely Likely Frequent 
Has occured - not likely Could occur Easy to postulate Occur regularly 
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Table D 3: Risks identified in brainstorming session 
Sub-element Undesirable event Causes Consequence Uncertainty/probability Consequence 
Category 
Comments 
HIPPS module HIPPS fails to 
isolate Vesterled 
pipeline (1) 
 
 
Hydrate formation 
due to cool-down 
effects during 
HIPPS functional 
tests (2) 
Failure of: actuator, 
logics, pressure 
sensors, valve 
components 
 
Off-spec water 
containment in gas 
 
Over-pressurization 
of Vesterled, 
shutdown  
 
 
Reduced capacity in 
pipeline, plugged 
pipeline 
Minor 
 
 
 
 
Minor 
Severe 
 
 
 
 
Moderate 
Ref: Section 3.7 
 
 
 
 
Ref: Section 4.1 
       
Isolation valves Fails to 
isolate/open (3) 
 
 
 
Defect ROV tool 
interface, corrosion, 
valve block defects 
IMR activities are 
delayed 
Unlikely Moderate  
       
Choke valve 
module 
Inaccurate 
regulation (4) 
 
 
 
Hydrate formation 
due to cool-down 
effects (5) 
 
 
 
 
Failure of: control 
system components, 
Actuator, 
Signal transmissions, 
Defect valve. 
Off-spec water 
containment in gas 
flow, large 
differential pressure 
across valve. 
 
 
Loss of system 
regularity 
 
 
 
 
Reduced capacity in 
pipeline, plugged 
pipeline 
 
 
 
likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Minor 
 
 
 
 
 
Moderate 
 
 
 
 
 
Severe 
 
 
 
 
 
Likely during life 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref: Section 4.1 
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Problems with 
retrieval of module 
(IMR) (6) 
ROV interfaces, 
Isolation valves (see 
Isolation valves) 
IMR activities are 
delayed 
Likely 
 
Moderate 
 
       
Subsea pig-
launcher 
Mating problems 
(7) 
 
 
Integrity of seal is 
not verified (8) 
ROV interfaces, 
vessel support 
 
 
Isolation valves, ROV 
seal integrity tools,  
   
Pig operation is 
delayed 
 
 
Pig operation is 
delayed 
Unlikely 
 
 
 
Unlikely 
Moderate 
 
 
 
Moderate 
 
       
Tie-in points Gas leakage (9) Integrity of Seal not 
provided 
Gas leakage Minor Moderate  
       
Manifold 
Structure 
Dropped objects 
from support 
vessels (10) 
 
 
 
 
Damage due to 
third party marine 
activity 
(11) 
 
 
 
 
During installation, 
during IMR activities 
 
 
 
 
 
Trawling activity, 
Anchor hooking, 
dropped objects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Damage of 
equipment and 
structures, loss of 
integrity, shut-down, 
Gas release 
 
Damage of 
equipment and 
structures, loss of 
integrity, shut-
downs, 
Gas release 
Remote 
 
 
 
 
 
Unlikely 
 
Severe 
 
 
 
 
 
Severe 
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Appendix E 
 
All-Electric Control System 
 
Table E 1: Technology Readiness Level for the All-Electric Control System. See Figure 47 for description of TRL’s. 
 
 
- The reader is referred to section 2.3.2 for references. 
An All-Electric control system was installed on K5F field in the North Sea in 2008. An examination of 
the system performance found that a total availability of 99.98% was achieved. The 2nd generation 
All-Electric control system is today going through a comprehensive qualification process. 
The All-Electric subsea control system was tested for a subsea well. No known projects have applied 
this technology for actuation of a 16’’ control valve with a Lithium-Ion battery power supply.   
The All-Electric control system satisfy the criteria (Figure 47): Full scale prototype built and put 
through a product qualification test program in (simulated or actual) intended environment.  This 
qualifies to TRL 4. 
To reach TRL 5, a full scale prototype must be built and integrated into intended operating system 
with full interface and functionality tests. The compliance between 16’’ control valve, signal 
TRL API 17N  
0 Unproven Concept 
Basic R&D, paper concept 
 
OK 
1 Proven Concept 
Proof of concept as a paper 
study or R&D experiments 
 
OK 
2 Validated Concept 
Experimental proof of concept 
by using physical model test 
 
OK 
3 Prototype Tested 
System function, performance 
and reliability tested 
 
OK 
4 Environment Tested 
Pre-production system 
environment tested 
 
OK 
5 System Tested 
Production Interface tested 
 
6 System Installed 
Production System Installed 
and tested 
 
7 Field Proven 
Production system field proven 
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transmissions and energy supply through a Lithium Ion battery must be verified before TRL 5 can be 
reached.  
 
Lithium-Ion Rechargeable battery package 
- The reader is referred to section 2.3.3 and 3.5 for references 
 
 
 
In 1987 the world’s first autonomous subsea production system was installed at the Luna 27 well in 
the Ionian Sea. Electric energy for the electric motor was initially provided by a Lithium battery 
package. The later years, according to the authors knowledge, no subsea projects have applied 
battery packages of comparable sizes (capacities). However, Lithium Ion battery technology have 
advanced rapidly the later years. And it is reasonable to believe that the feasibility of a high capacity 
subsea battery package has increased since 1987. 
TRL API 17N  
0 Unproven Concept 
Basic R&D, paper concept 
OK 
 
1 Proven Concept 
Proof of concept as a paper 
study or R&D experiments 
 
OK 
2 Validated Concept 
Experimental proof of 
concept by using physical 
model test 
 
OK 
3 Prototype Tested 
System function, 
performance and reliability 
tested 
 
OK 
4 Environment Tested 
Pre-production system 
environment tested 
 
 
5 System Tested 
Production Interface tested 
 
6 System Installed 
Production System Installed 
and tested 
 
7 Field Proven 
Production system field 
proven 
 
Table E 2: Technology Readiness Level for the Lithium-Ion battery package. See figure 47 for description of TRL’s. 
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The Lithium-Ion battery package satisfy the criteria: Full scale prototype built and put through a 
product qualification test program. The prototype is tested in a robust designed test program over a 
limited range of operation conditions to demonstrate its functionality. This qualifies to TRL 3. 
To reach TRL 4, further studies have to be initiated to identify  the capacity requirements (a coarse 
analyse was conducted in section 3.5.2). The compatibility between  the All-Electric control system 
and intervention vessels (for recharging) must be verified.  
 
 
Subsea High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) 
- The reader is referred to section 2.9 for references 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsea HIPPS is not considered conventional technology by the industry. It was first implemented in 
Shells kingfisher project in 1997 and in 2011, 11 subsea HIPPS had been installed worldwide. 
Normally are HIPPS valves actuated by hydraulics, which in the case of Heimdal Subsea System is not 
TRL API 17N  
0 Unproven Concept 
Basic R&D, paper concept 
 
 
1 Proven Concept 
Proof of concept as a paper 
study or R&D experiments 
 
 
2 Validated Concept 
Experimental proof of concept 
by using physical model test 
 
 
3 Prototype Tested 
System function, performance 
and reliability tested 
 
 
4 Environment Tested 
Pre-production system 
environment tested 
 
 
5 System Tested 
Production Interface tested 
 
6 System Installed 
Production System Installed 
and tested 
 
7 Field Proven 
Production system field proven 
 
Table E 3: Technology Readiness Level for Subsea HIPPS. See figure 47 for description of TRL’s. 
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possible. The actuation has to rely on electric actuators. The alternative is to use mechanical 
initiators, which according to the authors knowledge, has never been done.  Either way, this 
introduces the requirements of comprehensive qualification processes.  So to assign a TRL for a 
HIPPS in this case, is very complicated.  
Subsea HIPPS have proved their functionality, but not with the interfaces the Heimdal Subsea System 
introduces (electric controls).  Considering the HIPPS that have been installed, the technology satisfy 
the requirement: A full scale prototype has been built and put through a qualification test program in 
the intended environment. This qualifies to TRL 4. 
To reach TRL 5, a full scale prototype must be built and integrated into intended operating system 
with full interface and functionality tests. The compatibility between the barrier valves and electric 
actuators and/or mechanical initiator must be verified. 
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Appendix F 
 
Figure F 1 has been modelled in Autodesk inventor. The measures in the model are not correct 
according to the real measures of the module. The measures have been scaled to its real values 
based on the 16’’ isolation valves which the lengths are 1500mm. 
 
Figure F 1: Scaled measures of manifold with the basis of 1500mm 16’’ ball valves. 
 
Weight estimation calculations: 
These calculations are based on measures received from a valve manufacturer [95] and a report 
delivered by the engineering company Reinertsen [96]. Note that these are rough estimates. 
Isolation valves  
Ball valve size Weight [kg] Length (end to end)[mm] Number of valves 
16’’ 4080 1500 2 
32’’ 8000 Irrelevant for calculations 2 
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Flow control module 
The flow control module comprises a choke valve and control systems (actuator and instruments). 
Comparing to similar modules the module weight is assumed to be 30 tonnes. 
HIPPS module 
The HIPPS module comprises two barrier valves, actuators and instrumentation.  
Comparing to similar modules the module weight is assumed to be 30 tonnes.  
Subsea control system components 
The subsea control system comprises the SCM and EPCDU. The weight of these components is 
incorporated in the Weight/areal factor W (see structures), and in the HIPPS and flow control 
module. 
Structures 
To estimate the weight of the structures (and additional components), the areal of the manifold is 
multiplied with a Weight/areal factor “W”. This factor has been calculated based on similar subsea 
structures [96]. 
W = 830 kg/m2 
With reference to Figure F 1:  
Length of manifold = 16300mm 
Width of manifold = 10200mm 
Weight of structures = 830 × 16.3 × 10.2 ≈ 138 tonnes 
 
 
 
Piping 
With reference to Figure F 1: 
  Length[m] 
16'' 22.1 
32'' 5.6 
 
Assuming: 
-  steel density δsteel = 7840 kg/m
3 
- Wall thickness t = 18mm 
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Weight pipe 16'' 
Di [mm] 406.4 
t [mm] 18 
Density [kg/m3] 7850 
    
    
Weight [kg/m] 188.3941 
 
Weight pipe 32'' 
Di [mm] 812.8 
t [mm] 18 
Density [kg/m3] 7850 
    
    
Weight [kg/m] 368.79797 
 
  Length[m] Weight 
16'' 22.1 4163 
32'' 5.6 2067 
Sum    6229 kg 
 
 
Protection Structure 
Based on similar subsea structures, the weight of the protection structure is assumed to be 40 
tonnes.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
